The Lawyer - Economist at Chicago: Richard A. Posner and the Economic Analysis of Law by Minda, Gary
The Lawyer - Economist at Chicago:
Richard A. Posner and the Economic Analysis ofLaw
GARY MINDA*
INTRODUCTION
There was a time when law students were taught to approach the study
of law with the perspective of a natural scientist. In the tradition
established by Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard Law School in
the 1870s, law was conceived to be a "science" consisting of fundamental
"'principles or doctrines" that could be discovered by examining a relative-
ly small number of appellate decisions.' In Langdell's view, law students
could learn to discover the fundamental unity of the law by the inductive
process of analyzing separate cases. In quest of a scientific approach to
legal education, Langdell replaced the textbook and lecture with the
casebook and case method of instruction and devoted the entire study of
law to the methodical search for universal and immutable principles. In
revolutionizing the study and teaching of law, Langdell "inaugurated not
merely a new method of teaching, but a new mode of envisaging American
law."-
2
While the case method of instruction has survived as a professionally
relevant pedagogical tool, Langdell's conception of law seems to be dead.
* Assistant Professor of Law. Brooklyn Law School. The author wishes to thank Professors
Harlan Blake. Randal Edwards and Peter Strauss of the law faculty and Professor Donald Dcsc% of
the Economics Department at Columbia University who read an earlier draft and made many useful
comments and criticisms. The author also wishes to gratefully acknowledge a particular indebtedness
to Professor William Young and the graduate law students who participated in a law and economics
discussion group supported by the Center for Law & Economic Studies at Columbia University School
of Law during the 1977-1978 academic year. This Comment is, of course, the product of the author.
and he alone assumes responsibility for it.
I. Langdell stated his basic premises as follows:
[First] that lax% is a science, and [second] that all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books ....
... [T]he library ... is to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the
chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologists, the botanical garden
to the botanists.
Langdell. Harvard (Celebration Speech.3 L.Q. RES'. 123.124(1887). ScealsoC. LvNGnttL. Pre[aeto
SELECTION OF CASES ON TIlE L x" OF CO\TR \S s(1879). For a review and critical analvsis of Langdclrs
basic assumptions, see Holmes, Education for Competent Lang-ering-Case 3fethodin a Functional
Content. 76 COLUM. L. REV. 535.542-60(1976). See generally Ackerman, Introduction: On the Role
qf Economic Analrsis in Property Law. in Ecow\tosc FOUNDATION OF PROPERTY Lsw (B. Ackerman
ed. 1975).
2. H. REED. TRAINING FOR TIIF PUIILIC PROFESSION OF THE LAw 378 (1921). Langdcll's case
method was viewed as a "return to the principles of legal education demanded by the sery nature of the
common law." J. REDLICl. Tim CoiMloN L\w AND TIlE CkSE METOD I, A\IERIC%- UISERSIn
LAW SchooLs 37 (1914).
3. See. e.g.. Holmes. supra note I. at 555-56. But see note 8 and accompanying text infra.
Langdell's conception of law as an absolute system of principles was initially put to rest by the
skepticism of the legal realists. ,e e.g.. -rank. A Pica for LawyIer-Schools. 56 Y vu LJ. 13U3 (1947).
and the subsequent movement toxsard a 'scculari~ed" approach to law study. sce. e.g.. Woodard. The
Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Per, pective. 54 VA . L. REV. 689. 690-91 (1968).
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The idea of law as a universal body of scientifically discoverable princi-
ples appears absurd to modern legal educators who see law as "process,
flux, change."A As Professors Packer and Ehrlich have recently observed:
"[Liaw is now recognized by most teachers of law to be a multidimensional
phenomenon-historical, philosophic, psychological, social, political,
economic and religious."5 In their view law is not a science; it is a process
for administering and harmonizing the multitude of conflicting interests
within society. 6 When viewed as process, law lacks a fundamental unity
that can be discovered in the Langdellian sense. Some ideas, however.
never die. Instead, they merely reappear in a slightly different dress.
Richard A. Posner's Economic Analysis of Law7 is an example.
With the publication of the second edition of Economic Analy'sis of
Law, Posner has refined and polished a modern version of the Langdellian
idea that law consists of a rational and universal system of scientifically
discoverable principles or doctrines. 8 The central theme of Posner's book
is that the common law consists of a fundamental unity and that the "basic
characteristics" of the legal order can be discovered by applying the critical
analysis of economics. The seemingly unrelated subjects of contract,
property, tort, and criminal law are analyzed in the belief that the common
law consists of fundamental principles that are economic in derivation.
The differences between these substantive legal categories are seen as
"primarily differences in vocabulary, detail, and specific subject matter
4. Holmes. supra note I. at 556. Holmes points out that "[rilany such law teachers are
pragmatic in the social utility sense, rely heavily on experience as the chief source of wisdom. tire guided
by social science theories of evolution in social affairs, and proclaim relativity in customs, morals and
law." Id.
5. H. PACKER & I. EHRLICii, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDtUCAVlIO 56 (1972).
6. Id. at 56-58- see also Rosenberg. The New Looks in Law. 52 M %R,( I. RI v, 539 (1969-70),
Law as process is a central theme of Professor Alfred Conard's concept of "macroiutiec," Conard.
Macrojustice: A Systematic Approach to Conflict Resolution, 5 GiLORcIA L. Rmv. 415 (1971),
Macrojustice seeks to analyze law as a system orprocess in which the emphasis is placed on problems
ofjustice qua system (macrojustice) rather than justice qua individual (nicrtrolustice) I lie distainction
between macrojustice and microjustice is analogous to that betmeen macroeconomics, which is
concerned with aggregate problems of national income, inflation and employment, and microeconom-
ics. which is concerned with the activities of individual economic agents w ithin the market system. I he
macrojustice approach to legal education has shifted emphasis from principles to a process whereby the
study and teaching of law is viewed from a functional context. See Holmes supra note I. at 537,
7. R. POSNER. ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF L,\w (1972) [hereinafter cited as FcONOviit A%. %t 's'.l% I];
R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALISIS OF L-vw (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Eco'sovii" AN N'vs% II],
8. In his 1974 Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence. Professor Grant Gilmore cites Posner's
Economic Analtbsis of Law as an example of the "New Conceptualism" in legal scholarship that
Professor Gilmore views as a return to the unitary theories of Langdell G, CII MoRt. f-ill Aoi s ol
AMERICAN LAW 108 n. 11 (1977). In noting this same development. Professor Arthur I effconclutes
that Posner's book represents "a new basic academic theory of law."which Leff has entitled "American
Legal Nominalism." As Professor Leffexplains:
We are. I think, beginning to see in the speedy spread of economic analysi of law the
development of a new basic academic theory of law. Since its basic intellectual technique is
the substitution of definitions for both normative and empirical propositions, I would call it
American Legal Nominalism.
Left, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA, L. Rv. 451.459 (1974),
See also note 10 injra.
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rather than in method or policy." 9 In keeping with the basic tenet of the
Langdellian faith, Posner claims that "it may be possible to deduce the
basic formal characteristics of law itself from economic theory."' 0
There are, of course, significant differences in the Posnerian and
Langdellian approaches to the study of law. Whereas Langdell replaced
the textbook method of teaching with the case method, Posner has
reversed the process by utilizing the textbook approach. Economic
Analysis of Law is "mainly designed for use either as a textbook in a law
school course in economic analysis of law or as supplementary reading for
law students who are interested in finding out what economics may have to
add to their understanding of the legal process."" While Langdell
believed that law students could learn to discover fundamental principles
by the inductive process of analyzing cases, Posner believes that students
can learn to deduce unifying characteristics by applying economic analysis
to legal problems. While the student trained in the Langdellian tradition
was taught to approach law with the perspective of the natural scientist, the
Posnerian student is cast in the role of the economist. Despite these
differences in pedagogical approach, both Langdell and Posner share the
common belief that law students can learn to discover fundamental
principles in a logical and rational manner. To that extent, both conceive
the study of law to be a search for fundamental unity.
In claiming that it may be possible to deduce legal principles from
economic theory, Posner has presented an attractive argument for consid-
ering an economic approach to the study and teaching of law. The
justification for the use of economics in legal education is that it may
permit students to study legal doctrine in a more "analytical spirit" than is
permitted by traditional law school pedagogy.' 2 The underlying belief is
that an economic 'perspective can "teach more legal doctrine than the
9. EcoNoMic ANALYSIS II , supra note 7, at 179.
10. Id. at 189. In support of his conclusion that Posner's book represents a return to the
conceptualism of Langdell. Professor Gilmore points to an editorial Afteruord that Posnersirote for
the Journal of Legal Studies, which Posner has edited since 1972. G. GILIORE, supra note 8. at 108
n.l1. There, the parallelism with Langdell's basic premise is unmistakably clear. As Posner
expressed the idea in the Afterwvord
The aim of the Journalis to encourage the application ol scientific methods to the study o1 t he
legal system. As biology is to the living organisms. astronomy to the stars, or economies to
the price system, so should legal studies be to the legal system: an endeasor to make precise.
objective, and systematic observations of how the legal system operates in fact and to discover
and explain the recurrent patterns in the observations-the "lasss of the system. Although
much pioneering work of high distinction has been done, it is plain that our subject is in its
prescientific stage.
I J. LEG L ST D. 437 (1972). This view is remarkably similar to the ideas expressed in Langdelrs
Harvard address. supra note I. See also Leff, Law arid. 87 Y %ic L.J. 989. 1005-08 (1978).
11. EcoNos uc ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at xxii (footnote omitted). Poser has reprinted the
Preface to the first edition at xxi-xxiii of the second edition. The comments made therein are equally
applicable to either edition of Economic Analysis of Law.
12. See. e.g.. Ackerman, supra note latvii-x. See also Eco'costic A% L S ss II. supra note 7. at
18.
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current course in which so much time is devoted to the aimless study of bits
of history and 'relevant' cases."' 3 This Comment will evaluate the second
edition of Posner's Economic Analysis of Law in light of these claims. 4
The first edition of Economic Analisis of Law was widely reviewed by
scholars in both law and economics. 5 In the second edition, Posner has
made specific reference to some of the criticisms of the first edition and has
incorporated some, but not all, of the suggestions made by the reviewers.
One would expect that an author of a second edition would attempt to
respond to the principal criticisms raised by the reviewers of the first
edition, as well as to try to bring the first edition up to date. To the extent
that Posner has ignored principal criticisms, or has emphasized prior
eccentricities or questionable characteristics, one may be fairly critical
indeed.16 In reviewing the second edition, this Comment will also seek to
determine whether, in light of prior criticisms, Economic Analysis of Law
survives as an effective pedagogical tool.
In Part I this Comment reviews the organizational content of the
second edition of Economic Analysis of Law, identifies major revisions and
substantive additions, and highlights Posner's pedagogical approach. Part
II, in turn, reviews the fundamental concepts and the methodological
theme of Economic Analysis of Law as well as suggests areas in which
13. Ackerman. supra note I. at x. It should be noted that in stating the case for utilizing an
economic perspective in the traditional property law course. Professor Ackerman, unlike Professor
Posner, is careful to warn the reader of the potential dangers of adopting such an approach, In
Professor Ackerman's view, the greatest danger is that an economic perspective may encourage the
"naiVe belief that the economist's notion of 'efficiency' is sufficiently embracing so as to provide a
comprehensive touchstone for policy judgments." Id. at xi. See text accompanying note 79 intra.
14. While Posner has suppressed the jargon of economics from his book. this Comment will
review Economic Anal rsis of Lawt in the conventional terminology and theory of nco-classieal
economics.
15. See Baker. The Ideology ofthe Economic Analysis of Law. 5 PIIILOSOI'IIY & Putl, A;;, 3
(1975): Buchanan. Good Economics-Bad Law. 60 VA. L. REv. 483 ( 1974): Carrington. Bool Review.
1974 U. ILL. L.F. 187: Diamond. Posner's Economic Analrsis of Law. 5 lIt L J. EcoN. & NI %, x,; %it Nr
Sci. 294 (1974): Krier. Book Review. 122 U. PA. L. RE'V. 1664 (1974), Left. stpra note 8: Polinsky.
Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buver's Guide to Pomer's Econottic
Analysis of Law. 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655 (1974). Williams. Book Review. 45 U. Coto. L, R v. 437
(1974).
16. In the Preface to the second edition Posner identifies and rejects three criticisms of the first
edition:
Three criticisms of the first edition I reject. The first is that the book insufficiently
distinguishes the normative from the positive uses of economics in the study of law: that
distinction was (and remains) a point stressed in the text. The second is that the book lails to
deal in sufficient depth with the various legal areas discussed. This criticism misconceives the
purpose of the book. which is intended not as a treatise on the American legal system but as a
textbook on the use of economics to illuminate legal questions. tho e questions are therefore
treated illustratively rather than exhaustively. Obviously I do not think the law of federal
taxation, for example, can be treated adequately in the compass of a short chapter. But it is
not my purpose to survey the law of federal taxation; my purpose is to suggest some
problems in the field of taxation which economic analysis illuminates. The third criticism is
that by limiting discussion to the economic analysis of law the book provides too narrow a
perspective on legal problems: one reviewer took me to task for not citing any anthropolo-
gists' studies of property rights. But my purpose was not and is not to present the
sociological, the anthropological, or the philosophical approach tD law it is to present the
economic approach-matter enough for a book.
EcoNo.MIc Ax ALYSIS Ii. supra note 7. at xvii-xviii (footnotes omitted).
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further economic sophistication is needed. Part III discusses the role of
assumptions in Posner's analysis and the normative perspective that his
analysis embraces. Finally, Part IV evaluates and summarizes problems
and limitations in utilizing Economic Analysis of Law as a pedagogical
tool in law school teaching.
I. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTENT AND PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH
A. Revisions and Additions
Economic Analysis of Law first appeared in 1973 and was prepared
mainly in 1972. As Posner states in the Preface to the second edition, "the
literature on the application of economics to law has grown substantially.
and as a result the first edition is now out of date."' 7 Thus, the second
edition has been prepared with the main objective of incorporating the
recent literature in the field of law and economics.18 These recent findings
mainly concern the substantive topics of tort rights and remedies,'9prpry20cotat,1 • 2-:
property,2 contracts, 2 family law, 2 corporate finance,23 banking and trust
investment, " judicial process, 25 legal rulemaking and law enforcement, 'b
17. Id. at xvii.
18. The interdisciplinary field of law and economics has both an "old" and a "nes" component.
See Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 757 (1975). The "old" component.
which is now well established. involves the application of economic analysis to law school subjects such
as antitrust and regulated industries in which the legal issues invariably require the decision-maker to
turn to economics. See. e.g., Massel. EconomicAnalrsis on Judicial Antitrust -t't iions. 20 A BoA,
ANTITRUST SEcrbON 46 (1962). The "new" component, which is mainly covered in Posners book.
involves the application of economic analysis to common-law subjects such as contracts, property, torts
and criminal law, where the relevance of economics is less apparent. The new component origin can be
traced to the early 1960s and the publication of Coase, The Problem of Social Cost. 3 J. Lsw & Eco'N.
1 (1960), and Calabresi. Some 7houghts on Risk Distribution and the Lar of Tort%. 70 Y %I  I 4, 499
(1961). Since 1960, the literature of the new field of lass and economics has expanded to include well
over two hundred treatises and journal articles. The major contributors to the field includesomeofthe
most well-known scholars of both law and economics a reflection of the trul interdisciplinar%
character of the research. Some of this wxork is collected and briefly surnecd in Samuel%. lx(t41-
Economic Policy: A Bibliographical Survel. 58 Lsw LIBR Rt J. 2.30 (1965). and Samuels. Las and
Economics: A Bibliographical Survey. 1965-1972.66 L xw LuIR sRv J. 96(1973).
19. See Conley. 7he Value of Human life in the Demand for Safetr. 66 Ass. EcoN. Rt%. 45
(1976): Komesar. Toward a General Theory of Personal huryr Loss, 3 J. LEGAL StUD. 45 (1974):
Reder. An EconoimicAnralvsis of Medical .Malpractice. 5 J. LEGAL STvD. 267 (1976); Thaler& Rosen.
The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND
CoNsVMPTION 265 (N. Terleckvj ed. 1975).
20. W. BAXTER. PEOPLE OR PENGuits: Ti CkSE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974). Munch. An
Economic Analy-sis of Einent Domain. 84 J. Pot. Econ. 473 (1976).
21. See Posner & Rosenfield. Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analy-sis. 6 J. LEGAL STtD. 83 (1977).
22. See ECONOMIsWS OF TIIE FAMILY (T. Schult7 ed. 1974): G. BECKER.TIIE EcoNostc APPRO .( 11
TO Hv'MAN BuilAVIOR (1976).
23. See Posner. The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations. 43 U. Cot. L. RE%. 499
(1976).
24. See W. B-AXTER. P. COOTNER & K. ScoTT. RFT t, BS %KING IN TIlE ELECT-rRO'icAGE (1977).
l.angbein & Posner. Market Funds aid Trutst-hevstmenit Lasr. 1976 Ass. B. FOtNDAtTIoN REsES gc'iiJ.
I.
25. Landes & Posner, The hlidependent Judiciaryin an Iterest-Group Perspective. 18 J. L sw &
ECON. 875 (1976).
26. See Becker & Stigler. Law Ejforcement M.4alfeasance and Compensations of Enforcers. 3 J.
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and market regulations. 2' The bulk of the new literature cited by Posner is
Posnerian in origin.
Posner has not substantially altered the overall organizational con-
tent of the book. While the first edition of Economic Analysis of Law was
divided into six major parts that followed an introductory chapter, the
second edition is divided into seven.28 Part I, "Law and Economics: An
Introduction," incorporates the introductory material of the first edition,"
adds a section on the role of assumptions in economic analysis," and
draws in part from a 1975 Texas Law Review article by Posner that reviews
the new economic approach to law.3'
Part II, "The Common Law," surveys the legal subjects traditionally
contained in the first year curriculum and refines the methodological
theme presented in the first edition. In reviewing the substantive areas of
property, contract, tort, criminal and family law, Posner develops the view
that "the common law exhibits a deep unity that is economic in charac-
ter. 32  In the concluding chapter to Part II, entitled "The Unity and
Morality of the Common Law," Posner summarizes the analytical theme
of that portion of the book and provides some interesting commentary on
the relationship between the economic and moral content of the common
law. According to Posner, the common law can be viewed "as an effort to
attach costs to the violation of moral principles- principles that we have
suggested operate to enhance the efficiency of a market . . . econo-
my." 33 The economic and moral interpretations of the common law are
thus found to be in harmony.34
Part III, "Public Regulation of the Market," focuses primarily upon
the substantive topics contained in courses in antitrust, regulated indus-
LEGAL STUD. I (1974); Ehrlieh & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal RultnaA lng. 3 J. I I ci t
STUD. 257(1974); Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoreticaland Empirical A nahl istls01Q ,1. w
& ECON. 249(1976); Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement qfLaw, 4 J. LLGAL S rit t 1(1975).
27. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Posner, The Social Cost
of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); Posner, Themes of Economic Regulation, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT Sm. 335 (1974).
28. For a review of the organization and coverage of the first edition, see Krier, supra note 15, at
1672-73.
29. See EcoNo Ic ANALYSIS Il,supra note 7, at 3-12; ECONOMtc ANALYSIS l ,supra note7, at 1-6,
This material reviews the nature of economic reasoning and pre;cnts the fundamental concepts
utilized in Posner's analysis.
30. This section, "The Realism of the Economist's Assumption," ECONOMI A NALYSIS 11. stra
note 7, at 12-14, was apparently added to the second edition in respom.e to those who have criticiled the
economic approach on the ground that the assumptions of economic analysis are unrealistic, For a
fuller examination of the position of the critics as well as Posner's response. see text accompanying
notes 150-54 infra.
31. See Posner, supra note 18. The introductory material in the second edition also seeks to
answer some of the more general criticisms of the application of economic analysis to legal problems.
See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 19-23. For an alternative explanation of the economic
approach that Posner has applied, see G. BECKER, supra note 22, at 3-14.
32. EcONO UC ANALYSIS 11, supra note 7, at 179.
33. Id. at 186.
34. Id. at 185.
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tries and labor law.35 Part IV, "The Law of Business Organizations and
Financial Markets," reviews economic analysis relevant to courses in
corporations and securities regulation. Part V, "Law and the Distribution
of Income and Wealth," collects a mixture of topics relating to taxation,
the transmission of wealth at death, and problems of distributive justice.
In Part VI, "The Legal Process," Posner surveys a host of subjects covered
in courses in procedure and legal process. The breadth of the analysis
reaches both civil and criminal procedure as well as legal and administra-
tive process. Part VII, "The Constitution and the Federal System,"
reviews selected topics of constitutional law, including, inter alia, the
principle of separation of powers, substantive due process, federalism,
racial discrimination and the economic basis of freedom of speech and
individual liberty.
While the organizational content of the second edition of Economic
Analysis of Law has not changed substantially, there are a number of
revisions and substantive additions. In surveying the common-law
subjects, for example, the first edition devoted a single chapter to "crimes
and tort"36 and gave but brief mention to family law in a section contained
in a chapter on contracts.37 The second edition has expanded these areas
by devoting separate chapters to "The Criminal Sanction and Criminal
Law," "Tort Rights and Remedies," and "Family Law." The chapters on
criminal law and tort contain some new additions but are largely revisions
of the material in the first edition. 38 The chapter on family law, however,
contains mostly new material. 9
Perhaps the most interesting addition to the chapter on family law is a
section that develops an economic case for the legalization of the sale of
babies.40  That analysis is particularly useful for illustrating the "market
35. The material on "The Theory of Monopoly," id. at 195-209, and "TheAntitrust Laws,"id. at
211-37, is more fully developed in R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN EcoYoNsc PERSPECTIVE (1976).
For a review of that work, see Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheatfrom zCha 86
YALE LJ. 974 (1977).
36. EcoxONMic ANALYSIS I, supra note 7, at 66-97.
37. Id. at 61-64.
38. The new additions include economic analysis of intentional torts, the reasonable man
standard, medical malpractice, optimal criminal sanctions, multiple-offender laws and the defense of
compulsion. Ecoo.iic ANALYSIS II,supra note 7, at 119-22, 125, 157-59, 164-72, 172-73 and 175.
39. Id.-at 101-18.
40. Id. at 11-16. Posner's economic case for legalizing baby sales is characteristic of the work
of economists who have suggested that "children could be treated as durable consumer goods" for
purposes of applying economic analysis to marriage and the family. See G. BECKER, sWpra note22,at
169 (1976). See also T. SCHULTZ, supra note 22. In expanding upon that work, E. M. Landes and
Richard Posner have recently developed a model of supply and demand for babies for adoption to
show how the existing pattern of state regulation prohibiting baby sales has "created a babyshortage"
as well as "contributed to a glut of unadopted children maintained in foster homes at public expense."
Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323-24 (1978). In
presenting the case for legalizing baby sales, Landes and Posner have actually proposed that the states
begin "taking some tentative and reversible steps toward a free baby market in order to determine
experimentally the social costs and benefits of using the market in this area." Id. at 347. Seealso notes
42-43 and accompanying text infra.
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approach" that Posner developed in the first edition and that has remained
unchanged in the second edition. As Posner sees it, "[t]he problem of the
abused or neglected child arises when the parents discover some time after
the child is born that they are unwilling to make the minimal investment in
the child's upbringing required by the state."41 While the adoption laws
enable parents to rid themselves of unwanted children, evidence of a "baby
shortage" suggests to Posner that "the market for adopted children is not
in equilibrium.4 2 In his view, the market has failed because of"an artifact
of government regulation, in particular the uniform state policy forbidding
the sale of babies."4' In suggesting the "possibihty of a thriving baby
market" as well as the failure of government regulation, Posner points to
the reported evidence that has revealed the evidence of an illegal "black
market in babies, with prices as high as $25,000.,,1
4
Posner suggests that if parents were permitted to sell their children for
"profit," the market might correctly allocate children to individuals who
are "likely to give [them] the most care. ' 4  Since "willingness to pay" is
generally regarded as a reliable "index of value," the-reader is told that the
"sacrifice of a substantial sum of money" can be regarded as an indication
of the seriousness of the purchaser's desire to have children. 6 In response
to those who might claim that the "rich would end up with all the babies,"
41. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 112.
42. Posner suggests that the "baby shortage" is partly a result of such factors as "[tihe wide
availability and knowledge of contraception, the diminution in the stigma of being an unwed mother.
and the legalization of abortion [which] have reduced to a trickle the supply of children for adoption"
at the very time that "the demand for children for adoption is very high." Id. at 113. More recently,
Landes and Posner have noted that the disequalibrium in the "adoption market" actually represents
both a "shortage of white babies for adoption" and a "glut of black babies, and ofchildren who are no
longer babies (particularly if they are physically or mentally handicappd). for adoption." Landes &
Posner, supra note 40, at 324-25. As they see it, "[]ust as a buyer's queue is a symptom of a shortage, a
seller's queue is a symptom ofa glut. The thousands ofchildren in foster care . . . are comparable to
an unsold inventory stored in a warehouse." Id. at 327.
43. EcoNoiic ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 1i3. Posner argues that the regulation forbidding
baby sales has actually provided private, non-profit adoption agencies %% ith a monopoly over adoption
in some states and that it has been the adoption agencies which "are the most vigorous opponents of
allowing the sales of babies," Id. at 113-14. In developing their critique of such regulation. Landes
and Posner have gone on to argue that the "social welfare professionals" have been strong proponents
of state regulation because they would probably be eliminated by the "competitive margin" in a free
baby market. Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 347. This argument is explicitly made in "the spirit
of the new economic analysis of the political process. . . ." Id. at 324 n.5 (citing Stigler, Tie Tieory'
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MANAGEMENT Sci. 3 (1971), and Pelizman. Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & EcoN. 211 (1976)).
44. EcoNoNic ANALYSIS I, supra note 7, at 113 n.3 (citing Adoption and Foster Care, 1975
Hearings before the Subcomm; on Children and Youth of the Senat? Comm. on Labor and Pub.
Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)). He also notes the existence of a so-called "gray market" for
babies, consisting of independent or non-agency adoptions where the payment for an adopted baby is
allegedly concealed in the fee for services of the lawyer who arranges such adoption. id. at i 14, Se('
also Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 337-38.
45. EcoNoMiic ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 114. To those who might claim that "high-paying
adoptive parents may value the child for the wrong reasons". e.g., to subject them "to sexual abuse or
otherwise to exploit them," Posner argues that the existing "laws forbidding child neglect and abuse
would presumably apply fully to the adoptive parents (as they do under present law, of course)." Id, at
114-15.
46. Id. at 114.
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Posner argues that individuals with high incomes want smaller families,
and that, in any event, prevailing adoption procedures already favor the
rich.47 In a "free baby market" Posner concludes that lower income groups
might be able to buy children just as they are now "able to buy color
television sets. 45
Finally, for those who would find Posner's baby sale case to be
morally offensive because it involves the "spectacle of 'trafficking' in
human lives," Posner suggests that the "recent changes in public policy
concerning abortion" have undermined such objections. As he puts it: "Is
paying a pregnant woman to carry the child to term so offensive an
alternative to the abortion of the fetus?"49 While recognizing that the
market approach is not a "complete panacea," Posner, nevertheless,
advocates it as a plausible alternative to the current system of laws and
regulations that have been explicitly enacted for the benefit of children."
47. Id. at 115-16. Indeed, the suggestion is made that the price ofa baby of"equivalent quality"
may actually be much lower in a free baby market. As Posner explains:
In a free market, competition would tend to compress the price of babies for adoption to the
opportunity costs of the natural mother [i.e., mainly the cost of the time lost due to pregnancy
and actual medical expenses]. The net cost to the adoptive parents would be close to zero,
except that the adoptive parents would incur some costs in locating and trying to ascertain the
qualities of the child that they would not have incurred if they had been its natural parents.
Id. at 115. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 339-40.
48. Id. at 116.
49. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 116. Landes and Posner have suggested that those
observers who have moral objections to their proposal may really "wish to disguise facts that might be
actually uncomfortable if widely known [in a free baby market]." As they see it: "Were baby prices
quoted as prices of soybean futures are quoted, a racial ranking of these prices would be evident. .ith
white baby prices higher than nonwhite baby prices . . . . [A]nyone who thinks about the question
will realize that prices for babies are racially stratified as a result of different supply and demand
conditions in the different racial groups . . . ." Landes&Posner, supranote40,at344-45(footnotes
omitted). While recognizing that "bringing this fact out into the open [may] exacerbate racial tensions
in our society," they nevertheless believe that these so-called "symbolic objections" are outweighed by
the "substantial costs that the present system imposes on childless couples, aborted fetuses (ifthey can
be said to incur costs), and children who end up in foster care." Id. at 345-46.
50. In the second edition, Posner acknowledges that his baby sale proposal may not be a
"complete panacea; it is probably not usable in the case of the neglected or abused child. The market
price of most such children would probably be negative." Moreover, "a complete analysis whether to
permit the sale of babies . . . would consider the effect of a baby market on the rate of population
change and, in turn, the social costs associated with such change." EcoNosc ANALYS IS 11, mpra note 7,
at 116.
Recently, however, Landes and Posner have advocated that the baby sale proposal actually be
implemented on an experimental basis to obtain information on the demand and supply conditions in
the adoption market and to "help answer the question whether the payment of a stifffee has adverse
consequences on the welfare of the child." Landes & Posner, supra note40, at 348. As an interin step
toward a "full-fledged baby market," they suggest that "a market could be simulated if one or more
adoption agencies, which typically already vary their fees for adoption according to the income of the
prospective parents, would simply use the surplus income generated by the higher fees to make side
payments to pregnant women contemplating abortion to induce them instead to have the child and put
itupforadoption." Id. at 347-48. Curiously, Landes and Posner have ignored at least one ofthe'very
qualifications that led Posner to initially conclude that the baby sale proposal "is not a complete
panacea." ECONOMIC ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 116. Certainly, a "complete analysis" of the
Landes-Posner proposal must be qualified by the detrimental effect a baby market would likely have on
long-run policies dealing with population control and the production of children. See Eco'zost.c
ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 116-18. The social cost of encouraging the production ofchildren may be
a sufficient reason for rejecting the baby sale proposal irrespective of the results of the experiment
proposed by Landes and Posner.
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The economic case for the legalization of the sale of babies reveals two
questionable characteristics of Economic Analysis of Law. First, in
developing a common theme based on a market versus government
approach to legal and social problems, the book invariably opts for "the
lure of a simplistic 'just leave it to the market answer.' "' State laws that
forbid the sale of babies, for example, are used to illustrate how govern-
ment regulation can interfere with the "self-regulating" forces of the
market. According to Posner, children can be "allocated" for adoption
much like commodities are allocated in the market. Second, the analysis
of legal problems blindly assumes that individuals are the best judge of
their interests and that they will rationally seek to maximize their self-
interest. The suggestion that parents might sell their children for "profit"
might strike some readers as unrealistic. In Posner's view, however, the
rational pursuit of self-interest is the primary, if not exclusive factor for
predicting human behavior.52 The unrealistic nature of the assumption is
irrelevant to Posner's analysis.
There are other revisions and additions to Economic Analysis of Law
that are worthy of mention. In Part IlI, "Public Regulation of the
Market," the second edition has included a new section on antitrust
remedies" and has expanded a chapter dealing with the regulation of the
employment relation."4 The new material concerns the interrelationship
between labor and antitrust laws, minimum wage '(egislation, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and employment discrimination. In
Part VI, "The Legal Process," the reader will find a new chapter entitled
"The Process of Legal Rulemaking," which develops an economic
interpretation for the role of precedent and the evolution of legal rules. In
Part VII, "The Constitution and the Federal System," there is a new
chapter that discusses the principle of separation of powers, the constitu-
tional protection of rights, and rationality review." The reader will also
51. Randall, Coasian Erternality Theorr in a Polictr Conteva. 14 N %I, Ri "ot R- I ,, 35, 41
(1974).
52. The assumption of rationality can be criticized on at least two leilse, l- rst the astmption
of rationality is based on predictions of aggregate behasior o1 a gre it number ol individual, I te
assumption, therefore, does not rule out the possibility o1indi, :dual c, ses ol irrationality. Sc,. J,
HIRSItLEIFER, PRICE TIMORY AN APPLIC\TIoNs 8 (1976). Indeed, ,one can argue that a domnant
purpose for law is that it deals with the unpredictable case of indivilual irrationality Second. the
assumption of rationality tells us nothing about the underlying purposes or motie,, hr httnan
behavior. Professor Coase. for example. has recently noted that losntr'% oscrall approach to human
behavior has a major limitation in that it "tells us nothing about the purpose, for %% hich [people] cngay'e
in economic activity and leaves us vsithout any insight into why people do sshat they do," Coa e,
Economics and Contiguous Disciplines. 7 J. IFG \L STtD. 201. 208 (1978). -he problem. ol course, is
that sometimes people act rationally for the wrong reasons. See, e.g.. Fried. Right and Wrontng
Preliminarr Consideration. 5 J. LEG %L STtD. 165 (1976).
53. ECONOMIC ANALYSiS I. supra note 7. at 234-37.
54. Id. at 239-49.
55. Id. at 419-28.
56. Id.at491-96.
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discover a new section on reverse discrimination in the chapter dealing
with constitutional problems of racial discrimination. "
With the revisions and additions of the second edition the substantive
content of Economic Analysis of Law now embraces almost every course
in the law school curriculum. In the confines of a textbook Posner sets out
to weave the "exposition of the relevant economic principles into a
systematic (although necessarily incomplete) survey of the rules and
institutions of the legal system.", 8 Thus the second edition, like the first, is
in many respects "quite obviously a tour de force.""9  Not since William
Blackstone has a legal scholar attempted to capture the corpus of the law in
the confines of a single treatise.60 Indeed, while it took Blackstone four
volumes to survey the laws of England,61 Posner's "systematic survey" of
American law takes only one. Unlike Blackstone's Comnentaries.
however, Posner's legal survey requires the reader to master relevant
principles of law and economics, and therein lies the rub.
In fact, one criticism of the first edition was that the book's treatment
of the various legal areas was necessarily incomplete and thus flawed by a
certain "lightness of touch. 62  In his review of the first edition, for
example, Professor Krier asked "[C]an one really deal adequately with
estates in land in two pages, personal income taxation in ten, freedom of
speech in nine, exclusionary rules of evidence in three, restraints on
alienation and the rule against perpetuities in one, or labor law in five?"'"
Although Posner acknowledges this criticism in the Preface to the second
edition, he nonetheless rejects it on the ground that it is based on a
fundamental misconception of his book. As Posner explains:
This criticism misconceives the purpose of the book, which is intended not as
a treatise on the American legal system but as a textbook on the use of
economics to illuminate legal questions, those questions are therefore treated
illustratively rather than exhaustively. Obviously I do not think the law of
federal taxation, for example, can be treated adequately in the compass of a
short chapter. But it is not my purpose to survey the law of federal taxation:
my purpose is to suggest some problems in the field of taxation which
economic analysis illuminates.64
57. I. at 536-38.
58. EcoxoiIc" ANALYSIS Ii. supra note 7, at xxi-xxii.
59. Krier. supra note 15. at 1673.
60. In his review of the first edition. Professor Paul D. Carrington noted that "Professor
Posner's accomplishment is that he has reunited two di% ergent strands of rational intellectual tradition.
the classical economic rationalism sired by Adam Smith and the common law rationalism ' hich can be
said to date from William Blackstone." Carrington, supra note 15. at 187 (footnotes omitted), ToCarrington. many features of Posner's book "suggest[ed] that it might hase been isritten either b> a
resurrected Smith ora resurrected Blackstone." Id. To this reviewer. Posnerhas resurrected not ont%
Smith and Blackstone. but Langdell as well.
61. See W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON TIlE L vwS OF ENGLASND.
62. Krier.supra note 15.at 1673.
63. Id at 1675 (footnote omitted).
64. EcoNosIic ANALYSIS 1l. supra note 7, at xviii.
19781
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
It would, of course, be unfair to expect that Economic Analysis of
Law would or even could exhaustively consider every facet of the legal
subjects it purports to survey, even if that were a pur:pose of the book. As
the author of a textbook on the economic analysis of law, Posner certainly
cannot be criticized for failing to deal with every legal subject in a
comprehensive fashion. On the other hand, one can fairly ask, as
Professor Krier does in his review, whether the book would be a more
effective pedagogical book if it were limited to a selected legal area or a
limited number of subjects. As it now stands, the breadth of the analysis
may require the teacher and student to spend too much time reviewing and
supplementing the legal material instead of focusing on the economic
analysis.
B. Posner's Pedagogical Approach
Since Posner's Economic Analysis of Law was intended to show how
economics can be used to illuminate legal questions, its pedagogical
success or failure must ultimately be judged in terms of its effectiveness in
instructing law students on the art of economic analysis. Indeed, while the
book promises a unified theory for approaching a broad range of legal
problems, its analysis necessarily requires a modicum of economic sophis-
tication. Posner's pedagogical approach for acquiring that sophistica-
tion, therefore, requires careful scrutiny.
In the Preface to the first edition, Posner outlines the pedagogical
objectives of Economic Analysis of Law. Those objectives have remained
unaltered in the second edition. The underlying objective is to force the
law student and teacher "to confront economics notas a body of abstract
theory but as a practical tool of analysis with a remarkably broad
application to the varied problems of the legal system."' , The overall
approach thus seeks to "anchor discussion of economic theory in concrete,
numerous, and varied legal questions" as opposed to a discussion of
economics in the abstract.66 Moreover, except for a brief introductory
chapter that reviews but three fundamental concepts of economics," the
book explicitly avoids discussing economics as a separate and cohesive
body of knowledge. In Posner's view "[t]he emphasis on concrete
application rather than abstract theory should be congenial to the law
student trained by the case method. 68
At the same time, Posner has made the strategic decision to suppress
the use of the terminology of economics in concrete applications. "The
relentless if not complete suppression in the book of the jargon of modern
welfare economics ('Pareto Optimality' and the like) is designed to prevent
65. Id. at xxii.
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id. at 3-14.
68. Id. at xxii.
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the student from confusing economic analysis with the mastery of a
vocabulary."'69 As a tool of analysis economics is thus stripped of its
terminology as well as its explicit theory.
Finally, Posner has also decided to ignore any mention of the
limitations of economics as an interpretative and normative tool of
analysis. Posnerjustifies this omission in the belief that the limitations of
economics will be given sufficient consideration in the course of classroom
discussion of problems. As Posner states in the Preface:
The text is, I hope, sufficiently clear in most places that the instructorwill
not be obliged to translate it into still simpler terms for his students. He
should be able to use class time to probe the depth of the students'
understanding, both by putting questions to them based on the text and
by working through with them the problems that appear in footnotes
and at the end of chapters; many of the problems carry the analysis into
areas not covered by the text. The instructor will also want to use class
time to explore limitations of economic analysis, as both an interpretive
and a normative tool. I have not emphasized these limitations in the
text, in part to provoke student and instructor to challenge it by
formulating and arguing those limitations. I predict that students will
undertake the task with relish."'
Thus, Posner's pedagogical approach to the study of law and econom-
ics can be summarized follows: In balancing the competing objectives of
economic sophistication and legal relevance, the balance is struck almost
exclusively in favor of legal relevance. The overall strategy is to force law
students and teachers to learn economic analysis by the repetitive exercise
of applying it to a series of concrete problems. To simplify the task,
economics is treated as a mere tool of analysis; the discussion of economic
theory in the abstract is avoided and the technical jargon of the economist
is suppressed. While limitations of the analysis are recognized to exist, the
belief is that they will be mystically "discovered" in the course of examining
concrete applications. An implicit assumption is that the student and
teacher will instinctively discover all that is necessary and useful to know
about economics from the application of a limited number of fundamental
concepts.
While Posner's emphasis on concrete applications rather than ab-
stract theory is a good approach overall, there is reason to question
whether his book will accomplish the goals that the interdisciplinary study
of law and economics should pursue. At a bare minimum, the course in
law and economics should provide law students with a measure of
familiarity with the terminology and language of economics. In ap-
proaching an interdisciplinary course, the law teacher's task is "to meld the
learning of the two or more disciplines, rather than merely to permit those
69. hL
70. Id. at xxiii.
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disciplines to coexist proximately in mutual ignorance."'" In integrating
the disciplines of law and economics, attention must necessarily be given to
problems of communication and language.
Indeed, if law students are to be expected to carry forward the
learning of Economic Analysis of Law in subsequent work, they must be
able to communicate in the language of economics as well as law. In
suppressing the technical jargon of economics from his book, Posner
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for students to develop an
understanding of economics as a discipline and to apply that knowledge in
other areas. As Professor Paul D. Carrington observed in his review of
the first edition: "Students could devote quite a substantial effort to the
book without improving substantially their ability to communicate with
economists, to explore economics literature on their own, or to invoke
substantive knowledge of economics in the solution of public problems not
addressed by Posner. ' 7 2  Unfortunately, the second edition has ignored
Carrington's suggestion.
It is also essential that the student and teacher attain at least an
elementary understanding of the major limitations and assumptions of the
theory upon which the economic analysis of law is based. Posner,
however, has failed to provide adequate guidance for obtaining that
knowledge.13 Of course law students will probably challenge the instruc-
tor with questions concerning the limitations and assumptions laden in the
analysis of problems in the book. But will the students be able to identify
all the potential limitations? And where will the teacher find the
answers? 74  While the non-economist must be warned of the limitations
and assumptions of the economics that has been applied, in practice such a
warning requires the non-economist to learn a considerable amount of
theory."5 The danger is that an oversimplified treatment of economics
may give the unwarranted impression of clarity when there is in fact
71. Gorman, Proposalsfor Reform of Legal Education, 119 U. P, L. REv. 845, 848 (1971).
72. Carrington, supra note IS, at 191.
73. In the Preface to the first edition, Posner does suggest G. BEcI ER. ECONOMICTIIORY (197 1)
and G. STIGLER, THEORY OF PRICE (3d ed. 1966), as "two excellent bit difficult textbooks on price
theory" for those who seek extra guidance in economics. As Posner no*.es in the Preface to the second
edition, id. at xviii, there is now a new addition to the list ofavailable miroeconomic textbooks. Eg,,
J. HIRSHLEIFER supra note 52. In addition to the supplementary readings suggested by Posner, the
reader may also find help by consulting either D. DEWEY. MICROECONOMICS (1975) (a highly readable
and comprehensive review of microeconomic theory with particular emphasis on its limitations and
assumptions), or W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONs ANALYSIS (4th ed, 1977) (a more
sophisticated and mathematical treatment). Fora classic introduction and discussion of the limitations
of welfare economics, a branch of microeconomic theory relevant to Economic Analysis of Law see
J. GRAAFF, THEORETICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS (1957), and I. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1957).
74. While Posner has provided the teacher (not students) with a Teacher's Manual for guidance
on the problems and questions in the text, its discussion is admittedly preliminary and incomplete. See
R. POSNER, TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1977), See also, Krier, supra note
15, at 1698. What is really needed is a manual on economics for the non-economist.
75. SeeI. LITTLE, supra note 73, at 127.
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complexity and reason for caution. Although the reviewers of the first
edition warned of this danger,76 Posner has ignored the warning.
The major question that should be raised about Posner's pedagogical
approach is whether the trade-off of economic sophistication for legal
relevance is worth the price. The tension between the goals of economic
sophistication and legal relevance is undeniably a major pedagogical
problem presented by the study of law and economics. For the law
teacher the problem is one of devising the best means for imparting
economics to students "in a way that is both relatively sophisticated and
legally relevant., 77 Certainly it would be a mistake to transform the study
of law and economics into an undergraduate course in microeconomic
theory. After all, the a priori justification for the role of economics in the
law school curriculum is that it is relevant for the analysis of legal
problems.78 On the other hand, the demands of legal relevance should not
be pressed to the point that students lose sight of the significance of
economics as a discipline. The time devoted to the study of law and
economics will be wasted if the effort fails to equip students with at least an
elementary understanding of the relevant theory, terminology, history, and
limitations of economic analysis.
While there are admittedly no easy solutions for reconciling the
conflicting objectives of economic sophistication and legal relevance, the
problem cannot be resolved by treating economics or law with superficial
clarity. In the sections that follow this Comment will attempt to provide
some guidance for identifying areas where Economic Analysis of Law
requires further sophistication and development.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY
A. "Fundamental Concepts of Economics"
To comprehend the methodological theme that is developed in
Economic Analysis of Law one must first review the economic concepts
that Posner has selected as the basis for his analysis. In this regard,
perhaps the most surprising feature of the book is that the discussion of
economic theory is confined to only three "fundamental concepts of
economics. 79
In an introductory chapter Posner sets forth the economic principles
that serve as the foundation for the subsequent analysis. The cardinal
principle of economics from which the three fundamental concepts emerge
is the assumption that "man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life. 'SO
76. See, e.g., Krier, supra note 15; Polinsky, supra note 15.
77. Ackerman, supra note 12, at xi.
78. See. e.g., Lovett, EconomicAnalysis and ts Role in Legal Education, 26J. LEGAL Ew c.385
(1974).
79. EcoNoMic ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 3-12.
80. Id. at 3.
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This assumption is found to be implicit in Posner's definition of econom-
ics: "Economics, the science of human choice in a world in which resources
are limited in relation to human wants, explores and tests the implications
of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his
satisfactions-what we shall call his 'self-interests.' "81 As Posner points
out, "[i]t is implicit in the definition of man as a rational maximizer of his
self-interest that people respond to incentives-that if a person's surround-
ings change in such a way that he could increase his satisfactions by altering
his behavior, he will do so.
' 82
From his definition of economics 3 Posner derives three fundamental
concepts. "The first is the inverse relation between price charged and
quantity demanded, 84 or what the economist calls the "Law of De-
mand." 85 According to Posner, the law of demand has many applications
to the legal system:
The convicted criminal who has served his sentence is said to have "paid his
debt to society," and an economist would find the metaphor apt. Punish-
ment is the price that society charges for a criminal offense. The economist is
led to predict that an increase in either the severity of the punishment or the
likelihood of its imposition will raise the price of crime and therefore reduce
its incidence. The criminal will be encouraged to substitute other activity."6
The second fundamental concept is the economic definition of cost.
"Cost to the economist is 'opportuhity cost'-the benefit forgone by
employing a resource in a way that denies its use to someone else., 8 7
81. Id.
82. Id. at 4.
83. By defining economics as the "science of human (i.e., rational) choice." Posner's definition
"fall[s] into [the] error of including virtually all intelligent behavior." 1. KNIoGT, TILEco,,o,MIc'ot
ORGANIZATION 3 (1951). "Such definitions come too near to saying that economics is the science of
things generally, of everything that men are for practical reasons inteiested in." Id. at 4. See alio
Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 206 (1978).
The discipline of economics is, of course, characteristically a social science. Like many of the
social sciences, economics is devoted to the study of how society is oiganized and how individuals
interact within that organization. What distinguishes economics from other disciplines within the
social sciences is that"[e]conomics specializes in the study of that part of Khe total social system which is
organized through exchange and which deals with exchangeables." Boilding, Economiics as a Moral
Science, 59 AM EcoN. REV. i, 4 (1969). See also F. KNIGhT at 6; Coase at 206-07. While many
definitions of economics can be found in the textbooks, a commonly accepted definition is that
[elconomics is the study of how people and society end up choosing, with or without the use of
money, to employ scarce productive resources that could have alternative uses, to produce
various commodities and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among
various persons and groups in society. It analyzes the costs and benefits of improving
patterns of resource allocation.
P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs 3 (10th ed. 1976) (emphasis in original).
84. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 11, supra note 7, at 4.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 6. The concept of opportunity cost is based on the simple but important idea that there
are costs associated with every decision. As Professor Samuelson explains:
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Again, Posner finds that the opportunity cost concept has application in
the analysis of legal problems:
Among the many applications of the concept of opportunity cost to law,
consider the problem of computing damages for the loss of a child's life. If the
child has no earning power, his death will not have imposed a pecuniary cost
on the parents. However, we can compute the opportunity costs of the
resources invested by the parents in rearing the child by determining the
alternative price of the parents' time and other inputs (food, clothing,
education, etc.) into its rearinf, The sum of these prices is a minimum
estimate of parental loss ....
The third basic concept is "the tendency of resources to gravitate
toward their most valuable uses if voluntary exchange-a market-is
permitted."8 9 As Posner further explains: "By a process of voluntary
exchange, resources are shifted to those uses in which the value to
consumers, as measured by their willingness to pay, is highest. When
resources are being used where their value is highest, we may say that they
are being employed efficiently." 90
This last concept, the economist's notion of economic efficiency, is the
most important concept of the three for understanding the methodological
theme of Economic Analysis of Law. Because it is central to Posner's
"market approach" to legal analysis, it is important to understand what is
meant by his so-called "efficiency criterion." As Posner defines the
operative terms: "The terms 'value' and 'efficiency' are technical terms.
'Efficiency' means exploiting economic resources in such a way that
'value'-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willing-
ness to pay for goods and services-is maximized."9' To follow what
Posner means by the term of economic efficiency it is necessary to consider
some other related concepts of economics. 92
First, in order to understand Posner's use of "efficiency criterion" it is
important to distinguish three different meanings of the term efficiency-
technical, administrative, and economic. Administrative efficiency, a tra-
ditional concern of decision-makers, seeks to ensure that the administra-
tive cost of implementing a proposed rule or practice will be minimized and
that the rule will actually accomplish the function it was designed to
Thus Robinson Crusoe pays no money to anyone, but realizes that the cost of picking strav% berries
can bethought of as the sacrificed amount of raspberries he might otherwise havepicked withthe
same time and effort or sacrificed amount of forgone-leisure [sic]. The sacrifice ofdoingsomething
is called "opportunity cost."
P. SAMUEtSON, supra note 83, at 475.
88. ECONOMic ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 7 (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id. at 10.
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. The following discussion of economics is offered merely for purposes of providing some
introductory guidance for the reader untrained in economics. It would, of course, be beyond the scope
of this Comment to attempt a review of all the subtleties and complexities of the economic theory
relevant to Posner's book.
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perform. In legal decision-making, administrative efficiency is perhaps the
simplest reason for favoring one rule over another.93 Technical efficiency,
a concern primarily of engineers, seeks to determine the maximum amount
of output that can result from the allocation of productive resources in
society. It determines which uses of scarce resources would generate the
largest bundle of goods and services.
While economic efficiency is sometimes confused with administrative
and technical efficiency, it is a much broader concept than the latter two.
Economic efficiency is concerned with how scarce resources are allocated
among alternative productive uses and the resulting mix or selection of
goods and services that are produced.94  Economic efficiency is not only
concerned with minimization of the costs of implementation (administra-
tive efficiency) and maximization of output (technical efficiency), but also
with the welfare of society-whether the actual mix or selection of goods
and services are produced in accordance with what people want and can
afford. 95
The second point that should be noted about Posner's efficiency
criterion is that it is based on the economist's concept of "Pareto optimali-
ty. ''96 Pareto optimality is an evaluation concept developed by welfare
economists for determining when one state of economy is "better than
another in strictly economic terms." As Calabresi and Melamed have
explained:
Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would
lead to that allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense
that a further change would not so improve the condition of those who gained
by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off
than before. This is often called Pareto optimality.97
93. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and lnalienability: One Viewt of
the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089,1093(1972): Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Dcisio: Tlt'
Elusive Quest for Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REv 359, 391-2 (1975).
94. See D. DEWEY, supra note 73, at 215-16. (Professor Dewey uses the term "welfare"
efficiency for "economic" efficiency.)
95. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 93 at 1093-94.
96. Pareto optimality takes its name from welfare economist Vilfredo Pareto, who developed the
concept. V. PARETO, MANUEL d'EcONOIIIE POLITIQUE (2d ed. 1972). The logical foundation for the
concept of Pareto optiinality is based on the assumptions that each individual is the best judge of his or
her happiness and what economists call the impossibility of making interpersonal comparisons of well-
being. See Boulding, supra note 83, at 5-6. D. DEWEY, supra note 73, at 215. While some writers use
the terms Pareto optimality and economic efficiency interchangeably, others have preferred tile
technically more precise term "Pareto efficiency" to distinguish optimality in resource allocation from
broader concept of social optimality in the overall welfare of society. See Polinsky, supra note IS, at
1663 & n.45. The distinction is that it is possible for society's resource allocation to be Pareto efliclent
when the prevailing distribution of wealth and income is socially undesirabtle. The important point to
be emphasized is that the Pareto criterion takes the prevailing distribution of wealth and income in
society as a given and is thus at best only a necessary but not sufficient condition for attaining the
socially optimum level of well-being in society. See Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1668-69. See also Baker,
supra note 15; Thurow, Toward a Definition of Economic Justice, 31 PUn. INTEREST 56 (1973),
97. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 93, at 1093-94. While the Pareto optimality concept has
been subjdct to many definitional variations, see id, at 1094 n.10, Calabre.,,i and Melamed's definition
conforms to the definition found in most economic theory texts, See e.g., ). DEwY, supra note 73, at
214. It is important to note that while the Pareto criterion is usually defined in terms of a
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In other words an economically efficient allocation of resources would be
Pareto optimal in the sense that no reallocation(s) could be achieved that
would improve one person's economic welfare without making anyone else
worse off.
The Pareto principle is important to the concept of economic efficien-
cy because it supplies a normative justification for favoring legal outcomes
that are efficient in the economic sense. It is indeed difficult to argue
against a standard which by definition seeks to make at least one person
better off without making anyone else worse off.98 On the other hand, it
should be apparent that the Pareto principle has limited applicability for
evaluating most real world changes. The Pareto principle, for instance,
will be violated whenever some proposed change would benefit some and
harm others and the gainers could not compensate the losers for the losses
and still be better off. Since few real world changes harm no one, the vast
majority of policy proposals cannot be judged with the aid of the Pareto
principle alone. 99 This is particularly significant since the economic effect
of a proposed change can never be known in advance of the event. The
other important point to note about the Pareto principle is that it takes the.
prevailing distribution of wealth and income as a given and is thus at best a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for judging the well-being of
society. Thus, it is possible for society's resource allocation to be Pareto
efficient when the prevailing distribution of wealth and income is socially
undesirable.'
Another important concept necessary for understanding Posner's
efficiency criterion is marginal analysis-the principle that economists
utilize for solving problems of "maximization." As Posner tells the
reader, " 'efficiency' means exploiting economic resources in such a way
that 'value'-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer
willingness to pay for goods and services-is maximized."' 0' But how
does one know when value is maximized? The answer is supplied by one
compensation test (that is. can the gainers compensate the losers and still be better oll than before!).
this does not mean that compensation actually is paid ifsuch a change is made, but only that it could be
paid. See, e.g., Hicks, The Foundation of Welfare Economnics.49 EcoN. J. 696.711-12(1939).
98. The concept of Pareto optimality has both a strong and a weak sense. The weak version of
the concept is that asocial state is Pareto optimal if, and only if, it is not possible to move to any other
state without making at least one person worse off. The strong version provides that a social state is
Pareto optimal if. and only if. at least one person believes himself better offand nobody believes himself
worse off. Ackerman, supra note I, at xi-xii. The discussion in the text refers to the strong or
"superior" version of the Pareto optimality concept. a&
99. See W. BAUMOL, supra note 73, at 527 ("i]n other words, the Pareto criterion works by side-
stepping the crucial issue of interpersonal comparison and income distribution, that is, bydealingonly
with cases where no one is harmed so that the problem does not arise.").
100. For example, if income and wealth are not distributed equitably, then the efficient outcome
achieved by the market will fail to reflect the interest of those who lack sufficient purchasing power.
'An individual with no income or wealth may have needs and desires but no economic de-
mands. . . . The market quite efficiently adjusts to an inequitable distribution of purchasing
power." Thurow, supra note 96, at 57. See note 96 supra.
101. EcoNotIC ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 10.
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of the most fundamental and elementary ideas of economics-marginal
analysis.
10 2
Marginal analysis entered economics in the nineteenth century when
economists discovered differential calculus and applied it to formulate and
solve problems of maximization. Modern analysis of economic efficiency
seeks to determine when the net value of some activity is maximized, net
value being the difference between the benefits and costs of the pursuing
activity. Marginal analysis provides that the net value will be maximized
when the additional cost of expanding the activity-marginal cost-equals
the resulting additional or marginal benefit. When marginal cost equals
marginal benefit, further expansion will cost more than it is worth, and a
reduction in the activity would reduce benefits more than it would save
costs. 0 3 At that point the net value from the activity will be maximized.
When applied to legal decision-making, marginalism provides that the
decision-maker should evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative legal
outcomes by taking into account the marginal gain as opposed to simply
comparing aggregate totals.
Finally, the efficiency criterion is an important attribute of the
economist's model of perfect competition, or what Professor Polinsky has
referred to as the "competitive market paradigm. ' '11 4 Economists have
demonstrated that in the perfectly competitive market with no externali-
ties in production, the pursuit oT individual self-interest will lead to an
allocation of resources that is Pareto efficient.'0 5 Theoretically, this
means that the economic value of production and exchange in the
economy would move toward an optimum level for a given distribution of
wealth and income, and the economy would, with existing technology, be
producing the largest bundle of goods and services in accordance with
what people want and can afford. For every possible distribution of
income and wealth as well as for each "set of tastes and technology," the
102. For an introductory discussion of marginal analysis, see W. BAUMOL, supra note 73, at 21-
41. See also Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, 19 PuB. INTEREST 69, 70-71 (1970).
103. This assumes that as the level of activity increases both benefit,; and costs will increase, but
because of the law of diminishing returns costs will increase faster than benefits.
104. Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1665-69. See also D. DEWEY, supra note 73, at 127,139,
141-54.
In reviewing the first edition of Economic Analysis of Law, Professor Polinsky lamented that
Posner failed to provide guidance for understanding the competitive market paradigm that underlies
the methodological theme of the book. In seeking to fill this gap, Profe;sor Polinsky has set forth a
highly useful synthesis of the relevant economic theory of competitive markets. Tihis synthesis is
needed to understand the logic of Posner's analysis, as well as its assumptions and limitations, Indeed,
Polinsky's constructive criticisms and comments of the first edition provide an indispensable
supplement to either edition of Economic Analysis of Law. Unfortuntitely, Posner has refused to
either provide the reader with similar guidance or explain why that guidance has been withheld.
105.
Under perfectly perfect competition, where all prices end up equal to all marginal costs, where all
factor-prices end up equal to values of maiginal-products and all total costs are minimized, where
the genuine desires and well-being of individuals are all represented by their marginal utilities as
expressed in their dollar voting-then the resulting equilibrium has the efficiency property that
you can't make any one man better off without hurting some other man.
P.SAMUELSON,supra note 83, at 634.
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competitive market would lead to the Pareto efficient equilibrium state.'16
The significance of this is that it establishes the normative case for
competitive markets and provides the argument against state interferences
in market activity. In fact, the classical and contemporary case for
preserving competitive markets is based in part in the belief that the market
is necessary for economic efficiency. 107
In Economic Analysis of Law Posner has used the economic logic of
competitive markets as a descriptive and normative tool for analyzing the
doctrines and institutions of the legal system. For Posner the market and
legal system are similar in operation.' °8 Like the market, the legal system
is viewed as a competitive process in which the pursuit of self-interest
serves to promote an efficient allocation of resources. The "invisible
hand" of the market, for example, is found to have "its counterpart in the
aloof disinterest of the judge."'0 9 The adversary system is, in turn, seen as
a competitive process that forces the decision-maker to act as a consumer
in deciding "between the similar goods of two fiercely determined sales-
men."110 As in the market, the doctrines of the legal system are found to
create economic incentives that encourage individuals to maximize effi-
ciency."' Finally, "[l]ike the market, the legal system confronts the
individual with the costs of his act but leaves the decision whether to incur
those costs to him."'" 2  The ultimate question for decision in many
lawsuits is thus seen to turn on the outcome that would mimic the market
allocation and use of resources.
B. The Coase Theorem and the Common Law
The theoretical support for Posner's market approach is derived from
the so-called Coase Theorem," 3 which was formulated by Ronald Coase,
Posner's colleague in the economics department at the University of
Chicago. It is the Coase Theorem that serves as the intellectual core of
Posner's market approach to legal analysis.
106. Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1667. The ideal Pareto efficient state would. in theoty. arise
arise from some initial distribution ofincome and wealth that is considered socially appealing orjust.
Polinskyidentifies "the attainment the socially optimalorganization ofsocietyas a two-staged
process. First, redistributing income until the most desirable distribution is achieved. and then
allowing competitive markets to determine the Pareto efficient allocation of resources for this
distribution." Id. at1668-69. Most economists, however, stop short of addressing the public polic'
questions associated with the first stage of this process: Should one person's welfare, or wealth. be
increased at the expense of another's? Id. at 1669. But see Thurow, supra note 96.
107. There are, of course, other non-economic or "political" arguments that ha% e been advanced
in defense of the classical model of perfect competition. Seee.g., H. S ItIoss, Eco.NoMic PoLtCY FOR
A FREE SociEry (1948).
108. See, e.g., Eco, oltc ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 399-405.
109. Id. at401.
110. Id. at 400.
Ill. See, e.g., id. at 179-81, 399-400.
112. Id. at 399.
113. See Coase, supra note 18.
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In his discussion of property at common law, Posner poses the
following problem to prepare the reader for ihe analysis of the Coase
Theorem:
If a railroad is to enjoy the exclusive use of its right of way, it must be
permitted to emit sparks without legal limitation. The value of its property
will be impaired otherwise. But if it is permitted to emit engine sparks, the
value of adjacent farmland will be impaired because of the fire hazard created
by the sparks. Is the emission of sparks an incident of the railroad's property
right or an invasion of the farmer's? Does anything turn on the answer?
Suppose that the right to emit sparks, by enabling the railroad to dispense
with costly spark-arresting equipment, would increase the value of its
property by $100 but reduce the value of the farmer's property by $50 because
it would prevent him from growing crops close to the tracks.1
4
In assuming that the railroad and farmer can freely bargain over the
conflicting use of the common resource and that the cost of bargaining is
negligible, Posner concludes:
If the farmer has a legal right to be free from engine sparks, the railroad
presumably will offer to pay, and the farmer will accept, compensation for the
surrender of his right. Since the right to prevent spark emissions is worth
only $50 to the farmer but imposes costs on the railroad of $100, a sale of the
farmer's right at any price between $50 and $100 will make both parties better
off. If instead of the farmer's having a right to be free from sparks the
railroad has a legal right to emit sparks, no transaction will occur. The
farmer will not pay more than $50 for the railroad's right and the railroad will
not accept less than $100. Thus, whichever way the legal right is assigned, the
result, in terms of resource use, is the same: the railroad emits sparks and the
farmer moves his crops.15
As Posner observes, the engine spark problem demonstrates that
"[t]he efficient value-maximizing accommodation of the conflict will be
adopted whichever party is granted the legal right to exclude interference
by the other."' 1 6 That conclusion is an important attribute of the Coase
Theorem. Thus in its most basic form, the Theorem provides that, under
certain limited conditions, individuals will bargain their way to an efficient
allocation and use of resources regardless of rights and liabilities under the
law.''
7
To appreciate the significance of the Coasian analysis of the engine
spark problem it may be helpful to consider the economic theory from
114. EcONOic ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 34-35.
115. Id. at 35. As Posner illustrates in the text, the principle is not affected by reversing the
numbers. Id.
116. Id. (footnote omitted).
117. As Coase recognized, the legal outcome would have a one-tine effect oftransferring. wealth
to the party who is assigned the right to engage in economic activity. See Coase, stpra note 18, at 5.
As Posner notes, this one-time transfer of wealth may affect the actual use of resources by altering tile
demand for various goods and services and may even determine how the initial market assignment is
made if the right in question represents a large fraction of the wealth of either party. EcONOMIC
ANALYSIS it. supra note 7. at 35-36 n. I.
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which it emerged. The thrust of Coase's analysis in The Problem of Social
Cost was addressed to the problem of "externalities" in the theory of wel-
fare economics. n8 An externality is the spillover effect of an activity that
imposes cost or benefits on others without their consent. Thus, an
externality will exist whenever "some activity of party A imposes a cost or
confers a benefit on party B for which party A is not charged or compensat-
ed by (through) the price system."" 9
The engine spark case, like the standard nuisance problem of the
factory that pollutes the air or water in the course of its operations, is
the economist's classic example of an externality with a harmful spillover
effect. The property damage caused by engine sparks is a cost that is not
incurred by the railroad owner as a private cost of operating the rail-
road. 20  The continued operation of the railroad will impose harmful
consequences on neighborhood property, but the price system does not
charge the railroad owner for the cost of these consequences.121
The existence of externalities has troubled economists because exter-
nalities have been viewed as a source of inefficiency in the private market
activities of individuals and firms. Since the spillover effect of an
externality normally is not reflected in market prices or costs, it was
traditionally thought that private maximizing behavior would fail to take
account of the total "sociar' cost of all resources that are actually affected
by an economic activity.122 The fear was that either too much or too little
would be produced and that the resulting market allocation of resources
would be Pareto inefficient. A railroad owner's objective, for example, is
to maximize profits that represent the difference between the total cost of
production and the total revenue generated by railroad fares as determined
by market prices and costs. Since the private cost of operating the
railroad would not include the value of property damaged by engine
sparks, private and social cost would diverge, and thus the maximizing
behavior of the railroad owner would fail to utilize scarce resources in a
Pareto efficient manner.
118. For an excellent introduction to the problem of externalities in the theory of %%elfarc
economics, see D. DEWEY, supra note 73. at 221-28; J. HIRSnLEIFER, supra note 52. at 449-51; D.
VHITCOMB, EXTERNALITIES AND WELFARE (1972).
119. D. DEWEY, supra note 73, at 221.
120. The private cost of production would include only "the part of total cost that falls dircctl%
upon the producer." Id.
121. There are many legal problems that can be analyzed by the externality concept. The
standard negligence case involving an automobile accident. for example, can be viewed as an
externality problem. The personal and property damage caused by a negligent accident is the spillo% er
effect of driving. In the absence of liability rules, the effect of the externality is to shift the cost of
negligent driving to others. See, e.g.. Steiner, Economics, MoralitYr and the Law of Torts. 26 I.
TORONTO LJ. 227 (1976).
122. Social cost is the" 'true' total cost of producing a commodity, i.e. the value ofall resources
devoted to its production. . . . Thus [it] is the sum of(i) private costand (ii) costs that fallon persons
other than the producer (usually his workers and the general public)." In the engine spark case, total
social cost would equal (1) the private cost of operating the railroad and (2) the cost of property damage
caused by engine sparks. See generally D. DEWEY, supra note 73, at 221.
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In treating externalities as an example of "market failure,"'123 econo-
mists who followed the traditional analysis of the English economist A. C.
Pigou generally concluded that the way to prevent inefficiency in resource
allocation would be to manipulate the legal system to make those responsi-
ble for harmful interfering activity bear the cost of spillover consequen-
ces.12 4  Pigou's underlying logic was that the gap between private and
social cost should be closed by internalizing the costs of externalities into
the decision to pursue the offending activity. In the engine spark case, for
example, this analysis would suggest that it would be desirable to make the
railroad owner liable for the damages caused by the emissiori of engine
sparks.
125
What Coase did in The Problem of Social Cost was to uncover an
apparent oversight in the logic of the Pigouvian analysis by demonstrating
that, under certain circumstances, legal rules would have no effect on
resource allocation, and that the market would achieve Pareto efficiency
regardless of the spillover effects of externalities. Coase demonstrated that
in a "smoothly functioning economy" with full information, and zero
transaction costs, 1 26 individuals would bargain their way to a Pareto
efficient allocation of resources regardless of where the law determined
rights and liabilities. 27  If, for example, a railroad owner is initially
assigned a right to emit engine sparks at will and the sparks adversely affect
neighboring property owners, the property owners will have an interest in
offering the railroad owner a bribe to refrain from exercising the right toc, 128
emit sparks or, alternatively, to adopt spark avoidanc,. measures. If, on
the other hand, the property owners have a right to be free from the adverse
effects of engine sparks, the railroad owner will have an interest in offering
123. For a general discussion of the situations in which markets fail. see Bator. The Anatont r of
Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958).
124. See A. PIGot. TIIE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932). It was the conventional theory
and analysis of Pigouvian welfare economics that Coase challenged in Die Problem of Social COnt.
125. Alternatively. this analysis suggests that a tax should be imposed on the railroad owner
varying with the amount of sparks produced and equivalent to the damage caused, An alternative
would be to exclude the railroad owner from operating its engines near farming land when there is a
strong likelihood that emission of sparks would have harmful effects, See Coase, cupra note 18, at I.
126. "[T]ransaction costs are all the costs which inhibit comparatve markets from working,"
Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1667 & n. 67 (citing K. ARROW, The Organization of Economic Activity:
Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nounmarket Allocation, in JOINT ECONOMIC CoMM.
91ST CONG., IST SESS., THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: TnE PPB SYSTLM 47-
49 (1969)).
127. The logic of Coase's Theorem is based on the opportunity cost concept of economics,. Sce
generally notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra. Thus. if legal right!. are marketable, the parties
responsible for harmful externalities will take into account the opportunity cost of not bargaining with
the affected parties. Under the assumptions of the Coase Theorem, it is the opportunity to strike a
bargain that serves to bring the cost of the externality into the private market calculations of the
responsible parties. See D. DEWEY supra note 73, at 223-27.
128. It would be in the interest of the property owners to pay the railtoad owners an amount up
to the loss they would otherwise suffer as a result of the enginesparks. It would be in the railroad
owner's interest to accept that payment if the amount offered exceeds the cost of either foregone profits
or spark avoidance measures. If the loss due to spark damage is less than those costs, then no bargain
will be struck-and the loss will fall where it lies-on the property owners. In eithercase, resources will
be shifted to those uses that are Pareto efficient.
(Vol. 39:439
compensation in order to maintain railroad operations.129 In either case
the bargain that is ultimately reached will be based on the total cost of the
activity in question, and resources will be allocated efficiently.
Coase's analysis of the nuisance problem suggests that in a "smoothly
functioning economy" there is no need for judges to be concerned about
the economic consequences of their decisions. No matter where liability is
placed, private market negotiations will ensure that property rights, 30 are
utilized in an economically efficient manner. Indeed, the Coase Theorem
suggests that losses should fall where they lie. To attempt to alter the
market outcome would merely be an exercise in futility and, in any event,
the judicial shifting of losses would itself only impose additional costs.' 3I
In the Coasian world without friction, law is simplicity itself.
While the Coase Theorem suggests that liability rules have no effect
on efficiency, in the real world the rule of liability does matter.132  As
Coase recognized, there are simply too many imperfections in markets to
permit parties to bargain effectively. When the assumptions of the Coase
Theorem are not satisfied, which is typically the case, the rule of liability
will determine whether property rights are utilized in an economically
efficient manner. This will occur when the cost of bargaining is
prohibitively high, when the requisite information is imperfect or
expensive to obtain, when there are too many parties to make bargaining
feasible, or when it is not possible to exclude nonpaying users or "free
riders" from the benefits of a bargain.
Posner also recognizes that in most cases the rule of liabiliiy will be
relevant to determination of the economic efficient outcome. t33  For
Posner, the ultimate question is one of determining what the market would
do if private bargaining were feasible and if the logic of Coase's Theorem
were applicable.t3 4 Since Coase's Theorem assumes that transaction costs
are zero, Posner argues that the law should be structured to reduce
transaction costs where they exist in order for the Theorem to work.
When it is not possible to reduce transaction costs, Posner argues that the
law should be designed to "approximate" the Coasian outcome by
129. Alternatively, the railroad owner will agree to adopt spark avoidance measures ratherthan
pay damages to property owners if the former is less costly than the latter.
130. A property right means the right to exploit or utilize a scarce resource that is subject to
market exchange. For a review of the economic concept of property rights in the literature. see H.
MANNE, THE EcoNoMIcs OF LEGAL RELATIONSIIIPS (1975).
131. Steiner, supra note 121, at 232.
132. See Demsetz. When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? I J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972).
133. ECONOMic ANALYSIS 1l. supra note 7. at 36-39. Posner thus recognizes that
it does not follow the initial assignment of rights is immaterial from an economic
standpoint- Since transactions are not costless, efficiency is promoted by assigning the legal
right to the party who would buy it . . . were it assigned initially to the other party.
Moreover. . . . transaction costs are sometimes so high as to make transactions impracti-
cable. In such a case the initial assignment of rights is final.
Id. at 36.
134. See id.
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providing "incentives for value-maximizing conduct."'" To Posner, in
other words, the law should be designed to approximate the value-
maximizing solution that would be generated by market forces in the
frictionless world of the Coase Theorem.
36
In the case of the engine spark problem, for example, Posner
recognizes that transaction costs may be so high that the railroad and
farmer may fail to shift the initial placement of liability through private
negotiation. 137 In such a case, the rule of liability will determine whether
the assignment of the property right is efficient. While Posner recognizes
that the search for the perfect market solution may incur significant
administrative costs and require a comparison of an infinite number of
possible assignments of rights, 38 he nonetheless argues that in most cases
the value-maximizing solution can be approximated. Posner outlines the
nature of the problem as follows:
Our engine-spark example was grossly over-simplified in that it permitted
only two property right assignments, a right to emit sparks and a right to be
free from sparks. If administrative costs are disregarded, the combined value
of the farmer's and the railroad's property might actually be maximized by a
more complex definition of property rights, such as one that permitted the
farmer to grow one kind of crop but not another, to plant nothing within 200
feet of the tracks, and to have no wooden buildings within 250 feet of the
tracks, while permitting the railroad to emit sparks only up to a specified
level. The possible combinations are endless, and it is unrealistic to expect
courts to discover the optimum one. But in most cases, and without
excessive cost, they may be able to approximate the optimum definition of
135. Id. at 68. Posner illustrates this economic test with a hypothetical situation:
Suppose I sell wool to a garment manufacturer, neither of us inspects, the wool turns out to
have a latent defect, and the dresses he makes out of the wool I sold him are ruined. Assume
that the cost of inspection by either of us would be lower than the cost of the damage.
discounted by the probability that the wool would have a defect. The manufacturer sues me
for breach of contract. The central legal issue in the case is which of us had a duty to inspect,
The answer depends, as to an economist it should depend, on the I dative costs of inspection.
If it is cheaper for him to inspect, his suit will fail in order to encourage him in his future
dealings and others in similar situations to inspect: that is the solution that minimizes the sum
of inspection and damage costs.
Id.
136. In reviewing the first edition of Economic Analysis of Law, Professor Polinsky summarized
Posner's methodological approach as follows:
If transaction costs are zero the structure of the law does not matter because efficiency will
result in any case. If the market does not yield efficient results because of high transaction
costs, design the law to minimize these costs. If the market still does not work. design the law
to "mimic" the market. Compensation is not important except insofar as it is required to
achieve efficiency.
Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1665 (footnotes omitted). Posner maintains this methodological approach
in the second edition without substantial revision.
137. EcoNoMic ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 68.
138. As Posner now explains:
Unfortunately, the solution of assigning the property right to the party to whom it is more
valuable is incomplete as an economic solution both because it ignores the costs of
administering the property rights system, which might be lower under an alternative
definition of rights, and because it is difficult to apply in practice.
EcoNonic ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 36 (footnote omitted), While recognizing that the economic
solution may be incomplete, he nevertheless concludes that the law can at least approximate that
solution. Id. at 36-37.
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property rights, and these approximations may guide resource use more
efficiently than would a random assignment of property rights.1
39
Posner argues that the efficient outcome can be approximated in most
cases by-determining whether the economic value created by assigning the
property right to one party exceeds the loss of value to the party claiming a
conflicting use. The fundamental strategy seeks to identify the rule that
maximizes the net gain in value. To support his argument that the
analysis is workable in most cases, Posner cites a number of common-law
doctrines as examples of how the courts have implicitly applied the
principle in practice.140  Thus, for example, Posner discusses the
common-law doctrine of "distant views":
At common law, if a landowner built in such a way as to block his neighbor's
windows, he was considered to have infringed the neighbor's property rights.
Observe the consequences if the property right had been given to the other
party. Ordinarily the cost to this person whose windows were blocked would
exceed the cost to the other person of setting back his wall slightly, so the
former would buy the right. The assignment of the right to him in the first
instance avoids the transaction and its attendant costs. But the courts did
not extend the rule to protect distant views. If I had a house on a hill with a
beautiful prospect, and you built a house that ruined the prospect, I would
not be able to establish an invasion of my property rights even though the
value of my property had indeed fallen.' Here the presumption of relative
values is reversed. A house with a view commands a large land area. The
values that would be created by development of such an area are likely to
exceed the loss of value to the owner whose view is impaired.' 4'
As an alternative to his "approximation principle," Posner argues
that the efficient outcome can be attained through the law by minimizing
the cost of bargaining. Indeed, Posner argues that a number of common-
law rules can be viewed in terms of this goal. In his discussion of contract
rights and remedies, 42 for example, Posner suggests that many contract
doctrines are explainable as efforts "to reduce the complexity and hence
cost of transactions by supplying a set of normal terms that, in the absence
of a law of contracts, the parties would have to negotiate expressly.' 43 A
second economic function of contract law "is to furnish prospective
transacting parties with information concerning the many contingencies
that may defeat the exchange, and hence to assist them in planning their
exchange sensibly."'144  By reducing the cost of contract bargaining.
139. EcONomic ANALYSIS 1I. supra note 7, at 36-37. See also Posner. Strict Liahihtr: A
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
140. E.g., ECONoMIc ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 37-39.
141. Id. at 37.
142. Id. at 65-100.
143. Id. at 69.
144. Id.
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Posner suggests that the law makes Coase's market outcome more likely
and thereby encourages value-maximizing behavior.
145
In surveying the major common-law fields, Posner employs this
analysis to develop an economic interpretation of the common law.
According to Posner, "[t]he common law method is to allocate responsi-
bilities between people engaged in interacting activities in such a way as to
maximize the joint value, or, what amounts to the same thing, minimize
the joint costs of the activities.' 46  In short, Posner's view is that the
common law promotes efficiency in resource use by allocating legal
responsibilities in a manner that would serve to bring about the perfect
market outcome under the Coase Theorem. Posner's methodological
theme is thus based on the belief that the market analysis of the Coase
Theorem can be used to discern the fundamental unity of the common law.
That theme also provides a normative basis for evaluating legal doctrine.
Where efficiency has not been attained in practice, Posner argues that the
law should be restructured in accordance with the logic of the Coase
Theorem.
III. THE ROLE OF ASSUMPTIONS AND THE UNDERLYING
NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Both the Coase Theorem and Posner's methodological approach
assume that the economic problem of externalities can be solved in the real
world by designing the law to stimulate what market negotiation would
accomplish in a world in which there are no obstacles to bargaining. 147 An
145. Posner emphasizes a third economic function of contract law-that of maintaining
appropriate incentives. Id. at 65-69. Here the economic test is whether the imposition of contract
liability "will create incentives for value-maximizing conduct in the future." d. at 68, Se notes 133-
36 and accompanying text supra.
146. Id. at 179. While Posner has persuasively suggested tha, the common law promotes
economically efficient outcomes, he nevertheless has failed to provide an equally persuasive reason for
why thisis so. Posner's overall explanation for the apparent efficiency ofthe common law is based on a
theory ofjudicial motivation. In the first edition, for example. Posner argues that the common law
promotes efficient outcomes because judges tended to favor such outcomes in order to enhance their
own opportunities for-higher office, judicial or political." EcoNomic A14ALYsI I, supra note 7, at 325.
For a criticism of this view, see Leff, supra note 15, at 470-73; Kriersupra note 15, at 1693-97. In the
second edition, Posner discounts this view and now apparently believes that judges have simply
preferred efficient rules and that they have merely imposed "their preferences, tastes and values, etc,, on
society." ECONOlIc ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 416. Posner's theory of judicial motivation is
reminiscent of the skepticism of American Legal Realism and its now discredited preoccupation with
explaining causes of decisions in terms of psychological motivation. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND TIlE
MODERN MIND (193 I); Adler, Legal Certainty m Law and the Modern Mind A Synposlu n, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1931). The problem with all motivational arguments is that they fail to offer a
principled rationale for understanding the process of legal reasoning. Motivation and reasoning are
different concepts. See Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 77 YALE L.J. 411,425-28 (1968).
Although other commentators have recently offered an alternative explanation for the apparent
efficiency of the common law, see Priest, The Common Law Process ond the Selection of Efficlent
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient? 7 J. LEGAL STUD, 51
(1977), their theories raise essential empirical questions but do not provide supporting proof. Seealso
Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STVD. 393 (1978),
147. In the real world high transactions costs may prevent private bargaining, In such a case,
initial problem, of course, is the exceedingly difficult empirical task of
determining the perfect market outcome for any particular case.1 48 How-
ever, even if a rough approximation of the perfect market outcome could
be made, as Posner assumes, there are still other problems to worry about.
For example, Professor Polinsky has demonstrated that the perfect
market solution may not exist or, perhaps more importantly, it may not
lead to a socially appealing result. 49  The problem is that there are a
number of assumptions that must be made in applying the economic
theory embraced by Posner's book. While it would be a mistake to
conclude that the underlying assumptions of economics render the analysis
useless, it is important, at least for law students, to know what can and
cannot be accomplished by the theory that Posner has applied.
Indeed, one important criticism of the first edition of Economic
Analysis of Law is that it is based on the unsupported belief that the
theoretical assumptions of market behavior are useful for legal analysis.
In reviewing the first edition, for example, Professor Arthur Leff warned
the reader that
it must immediately be noted, and never forgotten, that [Posner's] basic
propositions are really not empirical propositions at all. They are all
generated by"reflection" on an "assumption" about choice uider scarcity and
rational maximization. While Posner states that "there is abundant evidence
that theories derived from those assumptions have considerable power in
predicting how people in fact behave," he cites none. And it is in fact
unnecessary to cite any, for the propositions are not empirically fashionable
at all.'50
More recently, Professor Polinsky forcefully argued that Posner's
first edition is "a potentially defective product" because it ignores certain
fundamental assumptions of the competitive market model that are most
likely to fail in the context of real world problems.151 In Polinsky's view,
both Coase and Pigou suggested that legal rules should be utilized to solve the economic problem of
externalities. The important difference between the two approaches is that traditional Pigousian
analysis suggests that the law should be used to internalize the cost of external effects by making the
responsible person bear those costs. Coase's analysis, on the other hand, rejects this vie%% and suggests
that liability should depend on the outcome that would be reached by private negotiation in a perfect
market. See generally D. DEWEY, supra note 73, at 223-25; J. HiRSIHIEiFER, supra note 52 at 451.
Indeed, according to Posner's Coasian analysis, the term 'externality' is itself misleading since "if
transaction costs are low the market may operate efficiently despite the presence of externalities."
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 52. It is important to note, however, that not all economists
have rejected the logic of Pigou's externality approach. Professors Whitcomb and Baumol, for
example, have recently offered arguments and proofs in support of the Pigouvian analysis. See, e.g., D.
WHITCOMB, supra note 118; Baumol, On Taxation and Control of Externalities, 62 Am. Ecov. REv.
307 (1972). In fact, their work has been viewed as responsible for a "neo-pigouvian resurgence" that
has offered a counter attack to the Coasian analysis applied by Posner. See Randall, supra note 51, at
40-46.
148. For a discussion of the empirical problems of applying the Coase Theorem to legal
problems generally, see Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability, Rules-A
Comment, II J. L. & EcoN. 67, 70-73 (1968).
149. Polinsky.supra note 15, at 1669-81.
150. Leff, supra note 15, at 457.
151. Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1680-81.
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the "[limitations of the competitive model for the analysis of the law may
be organized around failures of three key assumptions-zero transaction
costs, convexity, and zero redistribution costs."' 2 In his "final assess-
ment" of Posner's book Polinsky states:
A potentially defective product can be defective either because it is
manufactured improperly or because it is misused by consumers. Economic
Analysis of Law is likely to cause the greater damage through misuse by its
readers than through any inherent defects. The competitive market para-
digm, which is the basis of Posner's approach, require, a number of stringent
assumptions, many of which are likely to fail in the context of the real world
problems which Posner analyzes. These failures arise not only in the analysis
of legal problems, but also in many other problems to which economic
analysis is applied. However, the crucial assumptions are more likely to fail
in those areas in which the law plays an important role. Because Posner does
not make the limitations of the paradigm sufficiently explicit, readers not
fully aware of them may accept his conclusions uncritically or may extrapo-
late his analysis to draw conclusions unwarranted in reality.5"
While the second edition does not specifically address these criticisms,
it indirectly provides a rebuttal. In a chapter on the nature of economic
reasoning, Posner states:
No doubt the assumptions of economic theory are to some extent oversim-
plified and unrealistic as descriptions of human behavior-especially as
applied to such unconventional economic "actors" as the judge, the litigant,
the parent, the rapist and others. However, to criticize a theory on the
ground that its assumptions are unrealistic is to commit a fundamental
methodological error. Abstraction is of the essence of scientific inquiry.'
To buttress his point, Posner cites no less an authority than Milton
Friedman. 55 Friedman, in an essay entitled The Methodology of
156Positive Economics, defended the use of abstract theory in economic
analysis by claiming that a theory must not be judged by the "realism of its
assumptions," but rather by determining whether the theory sufficiently
predicts or explains reality. In his view, the lack of realism in a theory's
assumptions is a merit, not a demerit. To explain a class of complex
phenomena a theory must necessarily abstract from reality, and its
assumptions will therefore have to be "descriptively false" or "unrealistic."
152. Id. at 1671. The 7ero transaction costs assumption implies"that consumers and piodtiuce"
are able to obtain perfect information about market prices and product quaht at nocosts. and that the
process of exchange is itselfcostless." Id. at 1667. The conexitk assumption "limits the structure ol
the consumer's preferences and of the producer's tcchnology" and rules out the possibility that the
effect of harmful interfering activity may become so excessixc that it wsill no longer be subicct to
bargaining. d. at 1667-68 (footnotes omitted), The 7cro redistributitn cost asstumption "states that
the process of redistributing initial factor endowments among consumers is not costly in the sense that
it does not distort behavior, or involve administrative cost." i. at 1669 (footnotes omitted). For an
examination of these assumptions in the context of legal analysis. see id. at 1671 -80,
153. IdL at 1680 (footnote omitted).
154. EcoNotic ANALYSiS II, supra note 7. at 12-13 (footnote omitted),
155. Id. at 13 n.l.
156. M. FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITi'vE Ecoxositi 3 (1953).
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Thus, according to Friedman, the assumptions of a theory should be
accepted if they yield predictions that are "sufficiently good approxima-
tions for the purpose at hand.' 57
At first impression it would seem that Friedman's argument is
intuitively sound. After all,
[a] scientific theory must select from the wealth of experience that it is trying to
explain, and is therefore necessarily "unrealistic" when compared to actual
conditions. Newton's law of falling bodies, for example, is unrealistic in its
basic assumption that bodies fall in a vacuum, but it is still a useful theory
because it predicts with sufficient though not complete accuracy the behavior
of a wide variety of falling bodies in the real world.158
But while the predictive power of Newton's law can be tested by performing
a controlled experiment, the predictions of the economic analysis of law
cannot.15 9 The inability to conduct a controlled experiment is not.
however, a problem that concerns either Friedman or Posner. In Fried-
man's view, "[e]vidence cast up by experience is abundant and frequently
as conclusive as that from controlled experiments . ... 16 For Posner.
the predictive power of Economic Anal'sis of Law is established by
observing "the behavior of criminals, prosecutors, common-law judges.
and other legal system participants."'1
61
In relying upon Friedman's essay, Posner argues that those who
criticize his approach on the ground that is based on unrealistic assump-
tions "commit a fundamental error." What Posner fails to tell the reader,
however, is that Friedman's essay is only one side of a continuing debate on
an important and controversial methodological issue in the discipline of
economics. 1 1  Unfortunately, Posner has not told the readers the
complete story.
Paul Samuelson, for example, has characterized Friedman's
methodology as the "F-twist"-the idea that "[a] theory is vindicable if
(some of) its consequences are empirically valid to a useful degree of
approximation; the (empirical) unrealism of the theory 'itself,' or its
'assumptions,' is quite irrelevant to its validity and worth."'16 3 According
to Samuelson it is "fundamentally wrong" to assume that "factual
157. ld. at 14-15.
158. Eco\wmc AN \wysis 1!. supra note 7. at 13.
159. -A judicial decision is not a controlled experiment of the kind that one can make in physics
or chemistry, because one cannot repeat thejudicial'experiment' sith the same orvar~ingconditions."
Patterson. 77e Case Method in American Legal Education: Its Origins and Objectives 4 J. LEG %L
EJwc. 1.4(1951).
160. M. FRIEDMA, supra note 156, at 28.
161. Eco\o1Ic Ax l-Ys l1I.supra note 7. at 14.
162. For the other side of this controsersy. see T. Kooi,'sas,. Three Fssars on the State of
Economic Science 135-150 (1957); Nagel, Assumupions in Economic Theorq, 75 Ast. EcoN. Ass's
(Papers & Proceedings) 211 (1952); Samuelson, Discussion, 75 Am,. EcoN. AsS'N (Papers &
Proceedings) 227. 231 (1962).
163. Samuelson. supra note 162. at 232.
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inaccuracy even to a tolerable degree of approximation is anything but a
demerit for a theory or hypothesis."'' 64 While Samuelson does not argue
against the use of abstract concepts, he does claim that it is the economist's
responsibility to bring the abstractions of theory into line with reality. As
he sees it, the motivation for the "F-twist" springs from the Chicagoans
' 165
need to build a defense for "the perfectly competitive laissez faire model of
economics, which has been under continuous attack from outside the
profession for a century and from within since the monopolistic
competition revolution of thirty years past," and "the 'maximization of
profit' hypothesis, that mixture of truism, truth and untruth."'16' For
Samuelson, the harm of the "F-twist" is that it will lead to the belief that the
imperfections and inaccuracies of economic theory are irrelevant and will
serve to deflect consideration from the important task of determining "the
empirical validity that the propositions of economics do or do not
possess."'
167
As Samuelson suggests, the methodological debate over the role of
assumptions in economic theory is merely part of a larger controversy in
economics concerning the model of perfect competition. 168 In fact, the
neoclassical model of perfect competition has been under attack since
the 1930s, when Edward H. Chamberlin'69 and Joan Robinson 17" demon-
strated that the assumptions of the model fail to correspond to economic
reality. For them, modern industrial society is more accurately character-
ized by monopolistic or imperfect competition-an economic state in
which a small number of firms dominate the market. The significance of
this controversy is that it questions the classical justification for relying
upon the market to allocate scarce resources: If the assumptions of
164. Id. at 233.
165. It should be no great surprise that there are different "sch;ol " of thought %%itlnn the
academic community of economics, and that Posner's Economic Anah'sis of Law relies upon the so-
called "Chicago School." Since World War 11 the Economics Department at the University of Chicago
has been viewed as a leading advocate of the neo-classical theory of perf.ct competition and a critic ot
governmental intervention in the market. SeeP. Dot GI 5s. I\, Tlr F II I 5 ( oI I imi.127-28 1972),
L. SILK. THE ECONOaisTs 62-69 (1976). With but few exceptions. Poner cites only the economi"c
literature associated with the Chicago School. See Carrington. supra note 15. at 188. While the
second edition has cited some of the non-Chicagoan reviewers of the first 2dltion. the book continues to
rely mainly on the literature of the "Chicago School."
166. Samuelson. supra note 162. at 233. In the theory of the fir n. the "profit-maximi/ation"
h pothesis derives from the assumption that man is a rational maximi/er ol his ends i hile Indraming
on the profit motive. economists have assumed that "[aIll decision maker., consumers, entreprenceus,
and factor suppliers-are income [profit] maximizers." D. DEWEY. supra note 73. at 9.
167. Samuelson. supra note 162, at 236. Professor Koopmans, in turn, argues that this is"all the
more important in a field such as economics where, as Friedman also em:-haswies, the opportunitie Ie (r
%erification of the predictions and implications derived from the postulates are scarce and the outcome
of such verification often remains somewhat uncertain." T. Kooli %,,s. %upra note 162, at 141
Finally. Professor Nagel, who finds that Friedman's methodology mvy be valid in some case, and
invalid in others. makes the same point in asking: "But xvhat istobesaid oh a theor% %%ho massunpthons
are ostensibly unrealistic forevery domain?" Nagel. supra note 162. at 215.
168. L. SILK, supra, note 165, at 26.
169. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIST CONIPETITION (8th ed. 1962).
170. J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (2d cd, 1969).
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competitive markets inaccurately describe economic reality, there is
reason to question whether market behavior will serve to bring about an
efficient allocation of resources. Thus, while most economists agree that
abstraction is necessary for constructing a theory, there is no consensus for
placing reliance on the neo-classical model of perfect competition.
If economists have been unable to agree on whether the assumptions
of perfect competition correspond to the reality of the market place, there
is even greater reason for questioning whether those same assumptions
should be applied to the nonmarket context of legal problems. To argue
that Friedman's "F-twist" renders this question irrelevant is but an evasion
of the problem. The "F-twist" is itself merely an argument in the
continuing debate over the usefulness of neo-classical theory of perfect
competition. In adopting the "F-twist" as a reason for ignoring the
limiting nature of the assumptions of his analysis, Posner evades some of
the more fundamental questions raised by the market approach he applies
to legal problems. The danger, of course, is that Posner's Economic
Analysis of Law will give law students the unwarranted impression that
there is agreement when in fact there is controversy.
The Chicago School influence also provides a basis for understanding
the normative perspective that the Economic Analysis ofLaw embraces. In
the Chicago tradition, Posner's book is based on the belief that competitive
markets can be relied upon to serve the public interest by generating
efficient allocations of resources. Like the economists of the Chicago
School, Posner is skeptical of most governmental regulations of the
market. In adopting the Coase Theorem as a basis for analysis, Posner
ignores externalities of production and embraces the "competitive market
paradigm" favored by other Chicagoans.' 7 ' In relying upon Friedman's
"F-twist," Posner sets forth the classical Chicago School argument in
defense of neo-classical economic theory. In short, Economic Analysis of
Law is premised on the normative arguments that the Chicago School
provides for favoring decentralization in market decision-making.
172
While Posner claims in the Preface to the second edition that he has
sufficiently distinguished the normative from the positive uses of
economics in the study of law, he has nevertheless failed to mention that
Economic Analysis of Law is based on the ideological orientation of the
Chicago School of Economics. Nor has he advised the reader that other
171. Although all economists have a healthy respect for the market system, it is the Chicago
School that is the most critical of governmental interferences in the market. The Chicagoans have
traditionally maintained their defense of the market, however, by ignoring oligopoly and production
externalities-the two basic problem areas in modern price theory. See e.g., Dewey, Antitnut
and Economic Theorr: An Uneasy Friendship, 87 YALE L. 1516. 1517-18 (1978).
172. Those arguments are also set forth in M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALUSM A 'D FREEDO. (1962),
H. SI\I\os. vtqpra note 107.
1978]
OHIO'STATE LA W JOURNAL
relevant perspectives or schools of thought exist." 3 While the Chicagoan
tradition in economics is to be admired, one should question whether it is
proper for a law school textbook to ignore the existence of widely held
contrary views and theories.114  It might be, of course, that a one-sided
textbook was inevitable, for the developing field of law and economics may
simply be "too new, too rich in points of view, too little plowed in many
areas, to enjoy the harmony and confidence in ideas upon which a broad
text in the time sense depends.'" 5 But since Posner has elected to use the
doctrinaire approach of a textbook, he necessarily assumed the
responsibility to provide an open and complete review of both supporting
and contradicting views. 7 6 Since he has not done so, the shortcomings of
Economic Analysis of Law are serious indeed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The second edition of Richard A. Posner's Economic Analysis of
Law, like the first, presents a number of serious pedagogical problems. In
treating economics as a mere tool of analysis, stripped of its theory and
terminology, the book necessarily requires a measure of economic sophis-
tication for effective utilization and understanding The problem is that
most entering law students have not acquired a sufficiently sophisticated
familiarity with the theoretical concepts needed for the study of law and
economics. 177 The law teacher will therefore have a major responsibility
in supplementing Posner's book in order for law students to acquire the
economic sophistication it requires.
This, in turn, gives rise to the very difficult pedagogical task of
reconciling the conflicting goals of legal relevance and economic sophisti-
cation. The book seeks to emphasize the legal relevance of economic
analysis at the expense of other important goals of the interdisciplinary
study of law and economics. At a bare minimum, law students should be
173. For a non-Chicagoan criticism of both the Coase Theorem and the Chicago approach to tile
study of law and economics in general. see Samuels. The Coaw Thcortn and the Studi ol law aid
Eeononck. . 14 N T. RiSOt'R('iS J. 1(1974).
174. Id. See also Randall, supra note 51.
175. Krier, supra note 15, at 1702 (footnote omitted).
176. As Professor Samuels, an economist, observes:
lavs and economics deal %%ith a complex set of deep problems n ith respect to sNhich the
Chicago-Coasian approach represents only one particular normatie position. I he tudy ol
la%% and economies must not hase its consciousness either constricted or monopoli/ed by
casuistic theories and approaches wshich inhibit or normatisely channel consideration ol tile
important issues and deep problems. whatever position one persorially may take on them.
rhe stud% of lass and economics must not become the prisoner o the ideology to end
ideologies.
Samuels, supra note 173. at 32-33 (footnote omitted).
177. See Lovett, Economic Analysis and Its Role in Legal Education, 26 J, LLoAt E)_ 385.391-
93 (1974). Even if it is assumed that the law students bring with them a basic understanding of the
relevant economics, the law school will remain responsible for training them in the application of that
knowledge to legal problems.
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exposed to some of the language, concepts, theories, and history of
economics in order to carry forward that learning in subsequent work.178
It is equally important, of course, that law students gain a critical
awareness of the assumptions and limitations of the economic concepts
and theories relevant to their study. One simply cannot assume, as Posner
does, that law students will somehow mystically "discover" all they need to
know about the assumptions and limitations implied in the economic
analysis of law. While it is important to prevent the course in law and
economics from becoming a course in economic theory, some formal
instruction in the theories, assumptions and limitations of economic
analysis is unavoidable.
A fundamental source of difficulty presented by Posner's book is its
questionable pedagogical belief that law students can learn to discover the
fundamental unity of the law by simply deducing its formal characteristics
from economic theory. One may question whether the Posnerian twist to
the Langdellian faith is something that should be fostered in light of
modern reality. Certainly economics is relevant for the resolution of legal
disputes, but there are other important factors to weigh and consider.
In approaching Posner's book the reader will need to counteract what
Professor Leff has characterized as the book's "tunnel vision"; that is, the
simplistic idea that economic analysis is sufficient to embrace all human
behavior. 79  While Posner is correct in stating that the economic
approach is "matter enough for a book, 80 one can still fairly ask whether
that approach should be portrayed in disregard of "its limited place among
human interests at large."' 8 ' It is not merely that the book fails to cite
anthropological or sociological studies, but rather that a particular
perspective of a particular discipline is dogmatically characterized as a
universally satisfactory approach for analyzing legal phenomena.'
82
Another pressing problem raised by Posner's book is the way in which
ideology has been disguised as mere analysis. In advocating a "market
approach" to legal analysis, the book necessarily espouses the values and
goals of achieving economic efficiency in resource allocation. Indeed, one
aspect of the book's normative perspective is that it tends to stress the
importance of certain goals and to de-emphasize others. The instrumen-
tal character of the Coasian approach to legal decision-making, for
instance, emphasizes the importance of distributing rights and liabilities in
178. In economics, like law, the mastery of a language is an essential prerequisite for understand-
ing and applying its concepts and theories. The problem facing the la% teacher i% to make th.it
language intelligible. For a recent and largely successful attempt at making at least some of the
elementary concepts of economics intelligible, see L. SILK, EcoNolIcs IN PLI%, EG\LISII (1978).
179. Leff, supra note 15, at 451, 472-74.
180. ECONOMic ANALYSIS II, supra note 7. at xviii.
181. F. KNIGHT, supra note 83, at 3, quoted in Polinsky, supra note 15. at 1658.
182. In this respect, it may be wise for those who use Posner's book to keep in mind a bit of
wisdom from Professor Grant Gilmore: "The function of the lawyer is to preserve a skeptical relativism
in a society hell-bent for absolutes." G. GILMORE, supra note 8, at 110.
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a manner that would bring about an efficient allocation of resources:
Questions of corrective justice, however, are either ignored or placed in the
background.83 While Posner initially concedes that Economic Analysis
of Law may serve normatively as a "source of criticism and reform,
'
"
184
there is the danger that law students may accept the recommendatory force
of the book's approach without critically examining the value judgments
laden in the analysis. When students seek the extra-legal guidance of
economics in their law study, the pretense of positive analysis must be
abandoned. Students need to know the critical value choices that are
implicitly embraced by economic analysis in order to meaningfully
evaluate the usefulness of the analysis for real world problems. After all,
as Holmes has warned, the law can be civilized only to the extent it knows
what it is doing.85
Perhaps the most serious problem raised by Posner's book is the way
in which it views the legal system. By advocating a market approach,
Posner implies that judges should be encouraged to explicitly utilize the
instrumental criteria of economic analysis in common-law decision-
making. While reasonable persons can differ on the wisdom of Posner's
market approach, there is still the fundamental question whether this
approach is conpatible with the nature and function of our legal system.
As Professor Buchanan has asked, "[b]ut is it not 'bad law' to suggest that
the judge be guided in his decision-making by criteria other than those
offered in the existing institutional setting that he confronts?''lt More
fundamentally, do we want law students to perceive judges as having the
power to consciously engineer economically efficient legal outcomes at the
expense of other equally important social interests? 7 To expect that
judges should design the law for the specific purpose of 'achieving economic
183. See Baker, supra note 15; Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PIIILOSOPIIY &
lt iI. Ai i. 66. 86-90 (1972).
184. ECONONlic ANALYSIS II, supra note 7, at 17.
185. As Holmes explained:
I cannot but believe that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider more
delinitcl% and explicitly the social advantage on which the ruie they lay down iust te
justified. they sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident, and ee that really they
% ere taking sides upon debatable and often burning questions.
H olmes. The Path ol the Law. 10 H sRv. L. REV. 457.468 (1897).
186. Buchanan, supra note 15, at 489. The prevailing notion in Anglo-Americanjurispruden-
tial thought is thatjudges are not ordinarily supposed to disregard autho-itative legal standards nor are
they supposed to decide cases on the basis of non-legal standards unless expressly directed to do so,
The underlying idea is that "[i]n countless litigations, the law is so clear that judges have no discretion,
They have the right to legislate within gaps, but often there are no gap.." B. CARDo/o. lim NAiiRtt
Ol THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1921). Furthermore, even in those cases in which judge% may be
without the guidance of explicit standards for decision, it has been argued that the institutional setting
in whichjudging occurs places additional limits on whatjudges can refer to in decision-making. Sc'eR.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977).
187. The nature and scope of the judicial function raises a number of questions concerning the
application of the instrumental analysis of economics in decision-making. There are, for example.
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efficiency is perhaps a fundamental misconception of the function of a
judge. To argue that the law should be designed to promote economic
efficiency is politics, not science."' 8
The foregoing criticism does not mean that Posner's book is without
redemption or that the economic approach to law study is without value.
Most if not all of the pedagogical dangers of the book may be reduced once
their source is recognized. Law students can be given supplementary
materials and instructions on the economic theory that is relevant to
Posner's market approach. Explicit attention can be drawn to the
underlying assumptions, limitations and values of the analysis. Instead of
seeking to cover the whole range of the legal experience, the legal area
surveyed can be limited so that more time can be devoted to mastering the
economics of the analys is. At the very minimum, one should at least take
the time to understand the values and politics of Economic Anahysis of
Law so that the instrumental ends of the analysis can be critically
examined.
"characteristicallyjudicial virtues" that potentially constrainjudges in fashioning legal decisions. H. L
A. Hart has described these constraining virtues as "impartiality and neutrality in surveying the
alternatives, consideration for the interest of all who will be affected and a concern that some
acceptable general principle be deployed asa reasoned basis for decision." H. HART, TlE COCEPToF
LAw 200(1961). Professors Wechsler and Henry Hart, Jr., have, in turn, argued thatjudicial authority
rests on "principle neutrality" or "reasoned principle." See Hart, Forewardto The 7Tine Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law. 73
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959). The thrust of their argument is that judges should be constrained from
interjecting too much ideology into the process of decision-making at the expense of consistency and
principled reasoning. While judges may be required to make difficult choices between conflicting
values, they should make those choices in a fair and impartial manner by applyingneutral principles.
188. See generally Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion? 50 V,%. L.
REv. 413, 434 (1964).
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